

## 9 Text, translation, and commentary of the *Prathamamithyātvabhaṅga*

### 9.1 TEXT 1: Defining “illusoriness” (*mithyātva*).

#### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

ucyate—mithyātvaṃ hi tvayaiva pakṣāntaraniṣedhena pañcadhā niruktam. ta-trāḍye kiṃ sattve saty asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvo 'bhipretah? kiṃ vā sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantābhāvarūpadharmadvayam? yad vā sattvātyantābhāvavattve saty asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭam? (NAB: 53).<sup>1</sup>

#### Translation

[In response to the Advaita *pūrvapakṣa* just outlined, the following] is said: You yourself have defined “illusoriness” (*mithyātva*) in five different ways by refuting another position. With regard to the first of those [definitions of “illusoriness”, that is, “indeterminacy” in the form of “being the locus of neither existence nor nonexistence” (*sadasattvānadhikaraṇatva*)], do [you] mean:

- M<sup>1</sup>: the absence of a qualified entity (*viśiṣṭa*), namely “nonexistence qualified by existence”;
- or M<sup>2</sup>: a pair of [distinct] properties, namely (a) the constant absence of existence and (b) the constant absence of nonexistence;
- or M<sup>3</sup>: a qualified entity in the form of “the state of possessing the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the state of possessing the constant absence of existence”?

#### Comments

The “other view” (*pakṣāntara*) Vyāsātīrtha refers to here is the preliminary position that he has established for his Advaitin opponent in the “Analysis of Illusoriness” (*Mithyātvānirvacana*) portion of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. In that part of the text, Vyāsātīrtha considered thirteen definitions of the term *mithyātva*, but he only accepted five of those as being worthy of deeper analysis. “Indeterminacy” is the first of those five definitions.

<sup>1</sup> NAMu: 22v–23r; NAK: 91–92.

Vyāsātīrtha here presents three analyses of Citsukha's definition of "indeterminacy" as *sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvam*. The differences between them may seem subtle, but they have a substantial impact on the arguments Vyāsātīrtha makes against each definition in the PMBh. Madhusūdana will argue<sup>2</sup> that the three analyses Vyāsātīrtha proposes in this passage do not exhaust all possible interpretations of Citsukha's definition of "indeterminacy", since we could also interpret the term *anadhikaraṇatva* ("not being the locus of ...") as referring to mutual, rather than relational, absences.

For the most part, Vyāsātīrtha's arguments in the PMBh are directed against M<sup>2</sup> and M<sup>3</sup>. In both cases, Vyāsātīrtha interprets the term "not being the locus of ..." (*anadhikaraṇatva*) as referring to constant absences. However, whereas M<sup>2</sup> consists of two distinct absences, M<sup>3</sup> is a single, qualified/compound entity (*viśiṣṭa*) made up of the two constant absences of existence/nonexistence. According to Vyāsātīrtha, this has important logical implications for the Advaitin's case. M<sup>2</sup> consists of two separate things and, if the Advaitin uses it as their definition of "illusoriness", then the probandumhood in his inferences is determined by two separate properties. If, on the other hand, the Advaitin accepts M<sup>3</sup>, then only one property will determine probandumhood in the inferences.

Vyāsātīrtha argues that adopting these definitions leads the Advaitin into different problems in either case, and so the majority of the PMBh is structured as a dilemma. If the Advaitin uses M<sup>2</sup> as the probandum in his inferences, Vyāsātīrtha argues that he will be guilty of trying to prove something that his Mādhva opponent already accepts, at least in one part of his conclusion (*aṁśe siddhasādhana*). If, on the other hand, the Advaitin favours M<sup>3</sup>, then the probandum in his inferences will be an "unestablished" entity (the flaw of *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*). Both amount to fatal flaws for the inferences. Vyāsātīrtha further argues that both analyses lead to a common set of flaws. Both are contradictory (*vyāhati*), both ultimately fall short of proving what the Advaitin philosopher needs to prove (*arthāntara*), and, under both analyses, the Advaitin's example (the fake "silver") would lack the probandum (*sādhyaivaikalya*).

### Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)

nanu kim idaṁ mithyātvam sādhyate? na tāvan mithyāśabdo 'nirvacanīyatāvacana  
iti pañcapādikāvacanāt <sup>[1]</sup>sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvarūpam<sup>[1]</sup> <sup>[2]</sup>anirvācyatvam<sup>[2]</sup>.  
tad dhi kim <sup>[3]</sup>asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ<sup>[3]</sup>? uta sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantā-

2 See below, TEXT 4.

bhāvarūpaṃ dharmadvayaṃ? āho svit <sup>[4]</sup>sattvātyantābhāvatve<sup>[4]</sup> saty asattvā-  
tyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭaṃ? (NAB: 53–54.)<sup>3</sup>

1. sadasadanadhikaraṇatvaṃ AS<sub>Mu</sub>, AS<sub>My</sub>
2. anirvacanīyatvaṃ K<sup>D</sup>
3. sattvaviśiṣṭāsattvābhāvaḥ AS<sub>V</sub>, NAK (vL.)<sup>4</sup>
4. sattvātyantābhāvatve AS<sub>My</sub> (vL.)

### Translation

*Objection* (Vyāsātīrtha): Just what is this “illusoriness” (*mithyātva*), which you seek to prove [is present in the world]? In the first place, [“illusoriness” cannot be] “indeterminacy” in the form of “being the locus of neither existence nor nonexistence”, [which definition is] based on the words of Padmapāda’s *Pañcapādīkā*, which says: “The word ‘illusory’ refers to indeterminacy.” For, is [this “indeterminacy”]:

- M<sup>1</sup>: the absence of existence-qualified-by-nonexistence;
- or M<sup>2</sup>: a pair of properties, namely (a) the constant absence of existence and (b) the constant absence of nonexistence;
- or M<sup>3</sup>: a qualified entity in the form of “the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the state of possessing the constant absence of existence”?

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*)

siddhāntābhīdhanāṃ pratijñānīte—ucyata iti.

pañcadheti. sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvaṃ vā? sarvasmin pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvaṃ vā? jñānatvena jñānanivartyatvaṃ vā? svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva pratiyamānatvaṃ vā? sadrūpatvābhāvo vā? iti pañcaprakā-rair mithyātvaṃ lakṣitam ity arthaḥ.

tatrāद्या iti. sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvaṃ ity atra sacchabdaḥ sattvaparaḥ. tatra sattvaṃ kim asattvaviśeṣaṇaṃ vā? sattvāsattve pratyekam anadhikaraṇatvasya vi-  
śeṣaṇaṃ vā? sacchabdāt parato ’nadhikaraṇatvasābdarūpamadhyamapadalopisa-

<sup>3</sup> AS<sub>Mu</sub>: 48–49; AS<sub>My</sub>: 24; AS<sub>V</sub>: 29–31; K<sup>D</sup>: 3r; NAK: 91–92.

<sup>4</sup> Bagchi’s edition of the *Advaitasiddhi* (ASV) records this reading. Anantakrishna Sastri’s Kolkata edition of the text also reports this reading as being the reading given in Balabhadra’s *Advaitasiddhi* (*Advaitasiddhi* (ASV)). It is possible that Bagchi, who had extensive familiarity with the commentaries on the *Advaitasiddhi*, was reporting here the reading found in Balabhadra’s commentary.

māsāśrayaṇena sattvānadhikaraṇatvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ vābhipretam iti praśnavākya-rthaḥ. (NAB: 55.)<sup>5</sup>

### Translation

[Vyāsātīrtha] introduces [his] statement of the final position (*siddhānta*)—"It is said ..." (*ucyate*).

"Fivefold ..." (*pañcadhā*). What [Vyāsātīrtha] means is that "illusoriness" is defined in five different ways. Is ["illusoriness"]:

- 1. "Being the locus of neither existence nor nonexistence";
- or 2. [Something's] "being the counterpositive of an omnitemporal absence in every substrate where [it] was taken [to exist]";
- or 3. "Being liable to be cancelled by a cognition by virtue of the fact that [the cancelling cognition] is a cognition";
- or 4. [Something's] "being experienced in the very locus of its own constant absence";
- or 5. "The absence of the quality of being existent by essence"?

"In regard to the first of those [definitions] ..." (*tatrāḍye*). In the compound "being the locus of neither existence nor nonexistence" (*sadasattvānadhikaraṇatva*), the word *sat* ("existent/what is existent") means "existence" (*sat-tva*). In regard to this [definition of "indeterminacy"], is existence the qualifier of nonexistence? Or are existence and nonexistence individually the qualifiers of the state of "not being a locus ..." (*anadhikaraṇatva*)? Or is the quality of not being the locus of existence understood to be the qualifier [of the quality of not being the locus of nonexistence], by taking the [whole] compound to have an elided medial word, namely the word "not being the locus of ..." (*anadhikaraṇatva*), which would occur just after the word "existent" (*sat*)? This is the meaning of [Vyāsātīrtha's] question.

### Comments

In definitions (2), (4), and (5) of "illusoriness" here, Rāmācārya gives slightly different definitions to the ones that Vyāsātīrtha himself refers to in the Advaita *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. These modifications are all based on Vyāsātīrtha's analyses in the early chapters of the text, however. Rāmācārya goes on to give some grammatical explanation of how Vyāsātīrtha derives the three interpretations of the compound *sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvam* presented at the beginning of the PMBh.

<sup>5</sup> NAK: 91–92; NATMu: 10v.

## 9.2 TEXT 2: The charge of *siddhasādhana*.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

nādyah, manmate sadekasvabhāve jagati tasya siddhatvāt. (NAB: 53.)<sup>6</sup>

### Translation

M<sup>1</sup> is not tenable, because, in my view, [the absence of nonexistence-qualified-by-existence] is [already] established in the world, which is[, so far as I am concerned,] purely existent by essence.

### Comments

Vyāsātīrtha dismisses M<sup>1</sup> summarily. A means of knowledge such as inference must reveal to us something that we do not already know. However, if the Advaitin accepts M<sup>1</sup> as his analysis of “illusoriness”, then he is really proving something that his Mādhva opponent already accepts. According to Vyāsātīrtha and the Mādhvas, the world is, by its very essence, existent. Consequently, Vyāsātīrtha already accepts that the world has the absence of “nonexistence-qualified-by-existence”, and so the Advaitin is proving something that is already well-established to his opponent.

Rāmācārya and Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka analyse this argument using the principles of the Navya-Nyāya theory about the conditions under which the absence of a qualified/compound entity (*viśiṣṭa*) occurs in some location. The *Nyāyakośa* explains that the absence of (1) the qualifier, (2) the qualificandum, or (3) the entire qualified entity itself all occasion the absence of the compound entity in question. Take, for instance, some location (*L*) and the qualified entity “*b* qualified by/compounded with<sup>7</sup> *a*”, where *a* is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), and *b* is the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*). According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, the absence of the entire compound entity from *L* can be occasioned by either (1) the absence of *a* from *L*, (2) the absence of *b* from *L*, or (3) the absence of both *a* and *b* from *L*.<sup>8</sup>

Following this principle, we can say that any one of the following could occasion the absence of “nonexistence-qualified-by-existence” from the world:

1. the absence of the qualifier, i.e. existence; or
2. the absence of the qualificandum, i.e. nonexistence;
3. the absence of the compound entity, i.e. “nonexistence-qualified-by-existence”.

<sup>6</sup> NAMu: 23v; NAK: 92.

<sup>7</sup> For an explanation of how the term *viśiṣṭa* is used in this context, see above, Chapter 8, pp. 225–226.

<sup>8</sup> See NK: 779.

The Mādhva, who accepts that the world is by its very essence existent, necessarily accepts (2), i.e. that the world has the absence of nonexistence. Hence he logically accepts that the world has the absence of the entire qualified entity, and thus the Advaitin is guilty of proving something that his Mādhva opponent already accepts. Madhusūdana makes no attempt to defend M<sup>1</sup> against this argument, and instead focuses on M<sup>2</sup> and M<sup>3</sup> in his defence of indeterminacy.

### Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)

nādyah, sattvamātrādhāre jagaty <sup>[1]</sup>asattvaviśiṣṭasattvānabhyupagamāt<sup>[1]</sup>, viśiṣṭābhāvasādhane siddhasāadhanāt.

na dvitīyah, sattvāsattvayor ekābhāve 'parasattvāvaśyakatvena vyāghātāt. nir-dharmakabrahmavat <sup>[2]</sup>sattvarāhitye<sup>[2]</sup> 'pi sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopapattyarthāntarāc ca.

śuktirūpye 'bādhyatvarūpasattva<sup>[3]</sup>virahe 'pi<sup>[3]</sup> bādhyatvarūpāsattvasya vyatirekāśiddhyā sādhyavaikalyāc ca.

ata eva na tṛtīyah; pūrvavad vyāghātāt, <sup>[4]</sup>arthāntarāt<sup>[4]</sup>, sādhyavaikalyāc ceti cet; maivam, sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantābhāvarūpadharmadvayavivakṣāyām doṣābhāvāt. ... (NAB: 54.)<sup>9</sup>

1. sattvaviśiṣṭasattvānabhyupagamāt ASv
2. sattvāsattvarāhitye AS<sub>Mu</sub>, AS<sub>My</sub>
3. vyatirekasya sattvena  $\mathcal{L}(-K^D, ASv)$ ; vyatirekasya sattve 'pi ASv
4. arthāntaratvāt K<sup>D</sup>

### Translation

*Objection* (Vyāsatīrtha): M<sup>1</sup> is not tenable. For, [I] do not accept that the world, which [for me] is the locus of existence alone, has [the compound property of] “existence-qualified-by-nonexistence”. Hence if [you, the Advaitin,] prove [that the world has] the absence of [this] compound entity, it follows that you are proving something that is already established [for me].

M<sup>2</sup> is [also] untenable. For, if one or the other of existence or nonexistence is absent [from some location], the other must be present [in that same location]; hence it is contradictory [to prove that the world has the constant absences of both existence and nonexistence]. Moreover, [M<sup>2</sup> is not tenable] because [if you adopt it as the definition of “illusoriness” in your inferences,] then you are failing to prove

<sup>9</sup> AS<sub>Mu</sub>: 49–50; AS<sub>My</sub>: 24–25; ASv: 32–34; K<sup>D</sup>: 3r; NAK: 92–96.

what you intended to prove (*arthāntara*). For, even if [the world] lacks [the quality of] existence, it is [still] possible that [it] lacks “illusoriness” [defined as such]. For, even though [the world] lacks the quality of existence, it could nevertheless be *existent by essence*, just as in the case of [your] quality-free *brahman*[, which, according to you Advaitins is existent *by essence*, despite lacking the *quality of* existence].

Further, [ $M^2$  is not tenable] because [if you adopt it as the probandum in your inferences, then your example] lacks the probandum. For, even though the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl lacks “existence” in the form of “nonsublatability”, it is *not* established that [the “silver”] has the [other component of the probandum, that is,] the absence of “nonexistence” in the form of “sublatability”[, because the silver clearly is liable to sublation].

For the very same reasons [the probandum in your inferences cannot be]  $M^3$ . For, just as in the case of the previous definition [ $(M^2)$ ], there would be a contradiction, [your inferences would] fail to prove what you intended to prove (*arthāntara*), and [your example would] lack the probandum.

*Reply* (Madhusūdana): This is all wrong! For, there is no flaw if what is meant [by “indeterminacy”] is [ $M^2$ , i.e.] “a pair of properties in the form of the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexistence”. ...

### Comments

Madhusūdana here repeats Vyāsatīrtha’s critique of the Advaitins’ position before going on to indicate that he regards  $M^2$  as an acceptable definition of “illusoriness”. Madhusūdana begins his defence of  $M^2$  in TEXT 3, below, by defending it against the charge of contradiction.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*)

manmata iti. viśeṣyābhāvāyatto viśiṣṭābhāvo ’stīty arthaḥ. (NAB: 55.)<sup>10</sup>

### Translation

“In my view ...” (*manmate*). What [Vyāsatīrtha] means is that [the world has] the absence of the qualified entity (*viśiṣṭa*)[, i.e. “nonexistence-qualified-by-existence”], which is occasioned by the absence of the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*) [i.e. nonexistence].

<sup>10</sup> NAK: 92–93; NAMu: 10v.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakaṇṭhakodhāra*)**

manmata iti. asattvarūpaviśeṣyābhāvāpannasya viśiṣṭābhāvasya siddhatvena siddhasāadhanam iti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 60.)

**Translation**

“In my view ...” (*manmata*). Since it is [already] established [to us Mādhvas that the world] has the absence of the compound entity[, i.e. “nonexistence-compounded-with-existence”], which absence is occasioned by the absence of the qualificandum in the form of nonexistence, [you] are proving something that is already established [to your opponent]. This is the idea [behind Vyāsātīrtha’s words].

**9.3 TEXT 3: The charge of contradiction.****Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)**

na dvitīyaḥ, vyāhateḥ. (NAB: 53.)<sup>11</sup>

**Translation**

M<sup>2</sup> is untenable, because [it leads to a] contradiction.

**Comments**

See above, Chapter 6, pp. 162–173, for a detailed discussion of Vyāsātīrtha’s case that indeterminacy is a disguised contradiction in the *Nyāyāmṛta*.

**Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)**

... na ca vyāhatiḥ. sā hi sattvāsattvayoḥ parasparaviraharūpatayā vā? <sup>[1]</sup>parasparavirahavyāpakatayā <sup>[1]</sup>vā? parasparavirahavyāpyatayā vā?

<sup>[2]</sup>nādyāḥ<sup>[2]</sup>, tadanaṅgikārāt. tathā hi—atra trikālābhādhyatvarūpasattvavyatireko nāsattvam, kiṃ tu kva cid apy upādhou sattvena pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvam; tadvyatirekaś ca sādhyatvena vivakṣitaḥ. tathā ca trikālābhādhyavilakṣaṇatve sati kva cid apy upādhou sattvena pratīyamānatvarūpaṃ sādhyam paryavasitam.

evaṃ ca sati <sup>[3]</sup>na śūktirūpye<sup>[3]</sup> sādhyavaikalyam api, bādhyatvarūpāsattvavyatirekasya sādhyāpraveśāt. nāpi vyāghātaḥ, parasparaviraharūpatvābhāvāt.

<sup>11</sup> NAK: 93; NAMu: 23v.

ata eva na dvitīyo 'pi, sattvābhāvaṇvati śūktirūpye vivakṣitāsattvavyatirekasya vidyamānatvena vyabhicārāt.

nāpi tṛtīyaḥ, tasya vyāghātāprayojakatvāt; gotvāśvatvayoḥ parasparavirahavyāpyatve 'pi tadabhāvaṇor uṣṭrādāv ekatra sahopalambhāt. (NAB: 54.)<sup>12</sup>

1. parasparaviraḥṇ vyāpakatayā K<sup>D</sup>
2. tatra nādyāḥ Σ(-ASv, K<sup>D</sup>)
3. śūktirūpye na K<sup>D</sup>

### Translation

Nor does [M<sup>2</sup> lead to] contradiction. For, does [this contradiction] follow because:

- Reason (R)<sup>1</sup>: existence and nonexistence are each essentially identical with the absence of the other?
- R<sup>2</sup>: existence and nonexistence each pervade the absence of the other?
- R<sup>3</sup>: existence and nonexistence are each pervaded by the other's absence?<sup>13</sup>

R<sup>1</sup> is not tenable, because [I] do not accept [that existence and nonexistence are each identical with the absence of the other]. To explain—[In this definition of “indeterminacy”], nonexistence does not consist in the absence of existence in the form of “omnitemporal non-sublatability”. Rather, [nonexistence] consists in the quality of “not being the locus of the state of being experienced”<sup>14</sup> as existent in some substrate<sup>15</sup> or other”; and, [we] mean to say that the absence of [nonexistence so-

<sup>12</sup> ASMu: 50–55; ASMy: 25; ASV: 34–39; K<sup>D</sup>: 3r–3v; NAK: 96–99.

<sup>13</sup> Brahmananda explains Madhusūdana's analysis here as follows: *sattvasyābhāvo 'sattvam, asattvābhāvaḥ sattvam iti vā; sattvābhāvavyāpakam asattvam, asattvābhāvavyāpakam sattvam iti vā; sattvābhāvavyāpyam asattvam, asattvābhāvavyāpyam sattvam iti vā vyāghāte hetur ity arthaḥ*. (*Laghucandrikā*, ASMu: 50.) “Is the reason [that M<sup>2</sup> results in] a contradiction that: (R<sup>1</sup>) Nonexistence consists in the absence of existence [and] existence consists in the absence of nonexistence; or (R<sup>2</sup>) nonexistence pervades the absence of existence [and] existence pervades the absence of nonexistence; or (R<sup>3</sup>) nonexistence is pervaded by the absence of existence [and] existence is pervaded by the absence of nonexistence. This is what [Madhusūdana] means.”

<sup>14</sup> Elsewhere in the *Advaitasiddhi*, Brahmananda (*Laghucandrikā*, ASMu: 51) glosses the word *pratyamānatvānadhikarāṇatvam* with *pratyamānatvāyogyatvam*: “Not being fit to have the property of being experienced”. When commenting on Vyāsātīrtha's refutation of the second definition of “illusoriness” in the *Advaitasiddhi*, Madhusūdana (NAB: 71) defines “nonexistence” as “Not being fit to be an object of an experience in any substrate whatsoever” (*kva cid apy upādḥau prattīyanarhatvam*). The language Madhusūdana uses in this later portion of the text perhaps more clearly articulates his intended meaning than his use of the present participle in the present passage of the *Advaitasiddhi*.

<sup>15</sup> The term *upādhi* must be interpreted to mean “substrate” or “locus” in this context. Bagchi (ASV: 53) glosses it with the term *adhikarāṇa* (“locus”). Brahmananda (*Laghucandrikā*, ASMu: 51) glosses

*defined*,] is [part of] the probandum. Hence the probandum amounts to: “being cognised as existent in some substrate, while being different from what is not liable to sublation in all three times.”<sup>16</sup>

This being so, the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl[, which is the example in Ānandabodha’s inferences], does not lack the probandum [as you, Vyāsatīrtha, have claimed]. For, the absence of nonexistence in the form of “being liable to sublation” is not inserted into the probandum. Nor is there contradiction, since [existence and nonexistence so-defined] are not each identical with the other’s absence.

For this very same reason, R<sup>2</sup> is untenable. For, since the absence of nonexistence in the way [we] have defined it is found in the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl, which is devoid of existence, it follows that there is a deviation [between existence and the absence of nonexistence because the thing that was taken to be pervaded—the absence of existence—is found together with the *absence* of nonexistence, which nonexistence was taken to pervade it].

Nor is R<sup>3</sup> tenable, because it does not lead to a contradiction. For, even though cowness and horseness[, for instance,] are each pervaded by the absence of the other, their respective absences are observed to be present in a single location, e.g., a camel.

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Madhusūdana’s definition of “nonexistence” as follows: “Being cognised as being existent, which existence is present in some property-bearer (*dharmīn*)” (*kiñciddharminiṣṭhaṃ yat sattvam, tena pratīyamānatvam*). The term *upādhi* also appears, apparently with the same meaning, in Prakāśātman’s definition of *mithyātva*, which Vyāsatīrtha considers in the *Nyāyāṃṛta* (i.e. *pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratītyogitvam*).

<sup>16</sup> I translate this literally. However, there are a number of problems with interpreting Madhusūdana’s words here. The term *vilakṣaṇatva* usually has the sense of “being different from”, i.e. a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*, *bheda*) rather than a relational absence (*saṃsargābhāva*). However, M<sup>2</sup>, which Madhusūdana is here defending, consists of a pair of constant absences, which are relational absences. Bagchi (ASV: 36), apparently drawing on the *Laghucandrikā*, points out that if we take the definition at face value, Madhusūdana could be charged with repetition (*paunaruktya*), since he will shortly offer a definition of M<sup>2</sup> which defines it in terms of mutual absences (see below, TEXT 4). A further problem is Madhusūdana’s use here of the locative absolute phrase *trikālābādhyavilakṣaṇatve sati*. This sort of locative absolute phrase is usually used to represent a qualified/compound entity (*viśiṣṭa*) entity. However, M<sup>2</sup> consists in a pair of qualities rather than a qualified/compound entity. Bagchi (ASV: 36) again points out that Madhusūdana could be charged with repetition, since the definition now overlaps with M<sup>3</sup>, which is clearly stated to be a compound entity. It seems that Madhusūdana is simply speaking imprecisely in formulating the definition the way he does in this passage.

### Comments

See above, Chapter 6, pp. 167–173, for a detailed discussion of Madhusūdana’s arguments in this passage.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 1)

...<sup>17</sup> iti cet, maivam. asac cet, na pratīyeteti vadatā tvayā uktāpratītiṃ prati prayojakasya pratītyanupādhikasya sattvavirodhino ’sattvasya vaktavyatvāt; asattvābhāvaḥ sattvena pratīyamānatve paryavasanna iti tatsāadhanasya vyarthatvāt.

na cāsadvailakṣaṇyasiddhyartham tatsāadhanam iti vācyam, pratīyamānatvasyāsatsādhāraṇatvāt. tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ity asataḥ sattvena pratīteḥ śrutyānūditatvāt.

na cāsata iva pratīter anuvādo na pratītisattām āpādayatīti vācyam, asataḥ sattvena <sup>[1]</sup>pratītimanta<sup>[1]</sup> eka iti asatpratīteḥ sattvasyaivokteḥ.

na ca tad dhaika āhur iti śrutyā sad eva <sup>[2]</sup>somyedam<sup>[2]</sup> agra āsīd iti śrutyarthasābhāva eva pratipādyate niṣedhāyeti vācyam, sad eva <sup>[3]</sup>somyedam<sup>[3]</sup> iti śrutyarthābhāvasyāsattvenāsataḥ sattvapratītyanivāraṇāt. (NAb: 55–56.)<sup>18</sup>

1. pratītimata NAb, NAK
2. saumya NAb, NAK
3. somyedam NAK

### Translation

If [it is argued, as Madhusūdana does, that the charge of contradiction does not apply to M<sup>2</sup>], then this is wrong. For, if [you, the Advaitin,] argue [in favour of the indeterminacy of the “silver”] that, “If [the ‘silver’] were nonexistent, [it] would not be experienced”, then [you] must refer to a “nonexistence” that is characterised by the absence of experience, which is the reason for the stated failure to experience [the “silver”], and which stands in contradiction to existence. For, if [nonexistence is taken to be “not being experienced as existent in some substrate” then] “the absence of nonexistence” resolves into “being experienced as existent”, and proving that [the silver lacks “nonexistence”] is pointless [since it is already clear that we experience the “silver” as being existent].

<sup>17</sup> At this point, I have omitted a short passage of the *Taraṅginī* where Rāmācārya simply repeats Madhusūdana’s arguments against contradiction exactly as they are found in the text of the *Advaitasiddhi* given above.

<sup>18</sup> NAK: 99–100; NAMu: 11r.

*Objection* (Advaitin): Our purpose in proving [that the silver has the absence of nonexistence understood as Madhusūdana has defined it] is to show that [it] has the quality of being different from what is nonexistent. *Reply*: Do not argue as such! For the quality of being an object of experience belongs to what is nonexistent too. For, *śruti* [itself] recounts the experience of what is nonexistent as existent when it says, “As they say, this was nonexistent alone in the beginning ...” (ChU 6.2.1).

*Objection* (Advaitin): The recounting [in this passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*] of the experience of [what is nonexistent as being existent] does not confirm that this experience [of what is nonexistent] really took place, any more than it confirms that [in the beginning there was only] what is nonexistent. *Reply*: Do not argue as such! For, the passage *does* state the reality of the experience of what is nonexistent when it refers to “some ...” who have an experience of what is nonexistent as existent.

*Objection*: The *śruti* passage, “As they say, [this was nonexistent alone in the beginning]” (ChU 6.2.1), merely communicates the negation of the sense of the [preceding] passage of *śruti*, “There was being alone in the beginning, son,” in order that [the passage that states that there was nonexistence alone in the beginning] should be denied [by the subsequent words of the text].<sup>19</sup> *Reply*: Do not argue as such! For the negation of the sense [of the previous *śruti* passage] by the [subsequent] *śruti* passage, “This was being alone in the beginning, son,” does not rule out the fact that what is nonexistent was experienced as existent.

## Comments

Rāmācārya now responds to Madhusūdana’s attempt to solve the problem of contradiction. Madhusūdana argued that the charge of contradiction fails because “nonexistence” is nothing more than “not being experienced as existent in some substrate

<sup>19</sup> The famous passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* being referred to here by Rāmācārya sees Uddālaka Āruṇi instruct his son, Śvetaketu, about the origins of the universe. He tells Śvetaketu that the world was simply existent at its beginning, before going on to report the views of others that it originated from nonexistence, and denying the latter view in the next passage. The part of the ChU referred to here is 6.2.1. According to Olivelle’s (1998: 246) edition, the text reads: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. tasmād asataḥ saḥ jāyata. kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovāca. katham sataḥ saḥ jāyeta. sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*. Olivelle (1998: 247) translates this passage as follows: “In the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent—one only, without a second. Now, on this point some do say: ‘In the beginning this world was simply what is nonexistent—one only, without a second. And from what is nonexistent was born what is existent.’ But, son, how can that possibly be?” he continued. ‘How can what is existent be born from what is nonexistent? On the contrary, son, in the beginning this world was simply what is existent—one only, without a second.’”

or other”. Rāmācārya’s first argument is that it is quite pointless to prove that the “silver” has the absence of the property of nonexistence as Madhusūdana has defined it. If “nonexistence” is simply “not being experienced as existent”, then the “absence nonexistence” must consist in “being experienced as existent”. However, it is surely clear from the experience itself that the “silver” is experienced as existent. No one doubts that the victim of the illusion mistakenly takes the “silver” to be an existent object. So what is the point in proving that the silver has that quality?

Moreover, Rāmācārya argues that Madhusūdana’s definition fails to truly articulate a distinction between what is “nonexistent” and what is “illusory”, because nonexistent things too can be falsely taken to exist. He finds evidence for this in a famous passage from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In this passage, Uddālaka Āruṇi tells his son Śvetaketu that the world originated in existence. He then goes on to report the views of other thinkers who argue that the world originated in nonexistence, but rejects this view as absurd and reasserts his own claim that the world originated in existence. Rāmācārya’s point is that in reporting this misconception about the original state of the universe, the *Upaniṣad* is confirming that what is nonexistent was (mistakenly) taken to exist. The obvious retort is that this is a false view that the *Upaniṣad* adduces merely so that it can subsequently be refuted. However, the claim that this judgment is false does not imply that it never took place. The fact that the *Upaniṣad* reports and denies it seems to imply that some people did indeed take what is nonexistent to exist.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakaṇṭhakodhāra*, 1)

yad uktam, kva cid apy upādhau sattvenāpratīyamānatvam asattvaṃ vivakṣitam  
iti parasparavirahārūpatayā na vyāghāta iti, tan na. etādṛṣe ’sattve ’ṅīkriyamāṇa  
etādṛśasya bauddhena prapañce ’naṅgikāreṇa bauddhena saha vivādo na syāt.

kiṃ ca yady uktarūpam asattvam, tarhy asac cet, na pratīyeteti prayojyaprayo-  
jakabhāvo na syāt; abhedāt. api ca brahmaṇy aṅgīkṛtasattvavirodhina evāsattvasya  
vaktavyatvenaitādṛśāsattvasyāvaktavyatvāt. (NAB: 62.)

### Translation

*Objection* (Madhusūdana): What is meant by “nonexistence” is “the state of not being experienced as though existent in some substrate or other”, and so [existence and nonexistence] are not each identical with the absence of the other. Hence there is no contradiction [in proving that the world has neither existence nor nonexistence]. *Reply*: This is wrong! If [you] accept nonexistence defined as such, then, since [even] the [nihilistic-]Buddhist does not accept that [that sort of “nonexistence”] is

present in the world, there would be no disagreement [between you] and [those] Buddhists[, and yet you claim there is such a disagreement].

Moreover, if nonexistence is of the form [you] have stated it to be, when you make the argument, “If [the ‘silver’] were nonexistent, it could not be experienced”, [the two terms involved in the argument, i.e., “not-being-experienced” and “nonexistence”] could not stand in relation to each other as consequent and reason [respectively], since there would be no difference [between “nonexistence” and “not being experienced”]. Moreover, since [in making this argument you yourself] must refer to a “nonexistence” that stands in contradiction to the “existence” that [you] accept is present in *brahman*[, i.e., “omnitemporal non-sublatability”, you yourself] cannot refer to “nonexistence” in the form of [“not being experienced as though existing in some substrate or other”].

### Comments

Most of these arguments are drawn from the *Nyāyāmṛta* itself, particularly the *Dvītiyamithyātvabhāṅga*. See above, Chapter 6, pp. 173–184, for a discussion of the relevant passages. The “Bauddha” that Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka has in mind is, of course, the “nihilist” (*śūnyavādin*) who holds that the world is completely nonexistent, insofar as it is altogether lacking in essence (*niḥsvarūpa*).

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakāṇṭakoddhāra*, 2)

kva cid apy upādhāv ity atropādheḥ sattvaṃ vivakṣitam, na vā? ādye brahmaṇo 'pi sadrūpopādhau sattvenāpratīyamānatvenāsattvāpātaḥ, śūktirūpye 'tivyāptiś ca.

dvītiye yatkiñcidupādhau śaśaviṣāṇāder api śaśaviṣāṇam astīti vākyābhāsādinā tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ity ādiśrutyā ca sattvena pratītiśadbhāvād asambhavaḥ. (NAB: 62.)

### Translation

[In your definition of nonexistence as “not being cognised as though existent in some substrate or other”,] do you accept that the substrate [referred to] in the phrase “in some substrate or other” (*kva cid apy upādhau*) is existent, or not? If [you accept that the substrate *does* exist, then], since *brahman* itself is[, according to you,] not cognised as though it exists in a substrate that is existent by essence, it follows that [*brahman*] too must be “nonexistent”! Moreover, the [definition of nonexistence] would[, in that case,] apply inappropriately to the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl [because the “silver” too is not cognised as existent in

some existent location, since you hold that the mother-of-pearl itself is “illusory” and therefore not existent].

If [you accept that the “substrate” referred to in this definition does *not* exist,] then [your definition of “nonexistence”] fails to apply to any nonexistent thing (*asambhava*). For, we can have the cognition of a hare’s horn, etc., as existent in some location or other by means of a false statement such as, “There is a hare’s horn”, or even by scripture itself which states, “As they say, this was nonexistent alone in the beginning” (ChU 6.2.1).

### Comments

Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka now draws on Vyāsatīrtha’s own arguments in the *Nyāyāmṛta* to respond to Madhusūdana’s attempts to define nonexistence. He contends that Madhusūdana’s definition of “nonexistence” is simply inapplicable (*asambhava*) to nonexistent things. Like Vyāsatīrtha, he points out that certain speech acts such as lies, for instance, can induce cognitions that nonexistent things are real. If, for instance, a young child who is unaware that hares never have horns were to be told that they do, there would be nothing to stop her from having a cognition such as “There is a hare with a horn in such and such a place”.

## 9.4 TEXT 4: The charge of *arthāntara*.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

nirdharmakabrahmavat sattvarāhitye 'pi sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopapattyārthāntarāc ca. (NAB: 53.)<sup>20</sup>

### Translation

Moreover, [ $M^2$  is not a tenable definition of “illusoriness”] because [if you adopt it as the probandum in your inferences, then those inferences would] fail to prove what you really intend to prove (*arthāntara*). For, even though [the world] might lack the quality of existence (*sat-tva*), [it could] still be existent by essence, and hence devoid of “illusoriness” [defined as  $M^2$ ], just as [you, the Advaitin, accept that] *brahman* is free from all qualities[, yet is existent by essence].

<sup>20</sup> NAK: 103; NAMu: 24v.

### Comments

Vyāsātīrtha now argues that  $M^2$  suffers from the flaw of *arthāntara*, a charge that he will claim also applies to  $M^3$  (TEXT 7). In the classical debate manuals, *arthāntara* is technically a “defeater” or “clincher” (*nigrahasthāna*). In the way that Vyāsātīrtha uses the term, it applies when an inferential argument falls short of proving the conclusion that the person making that argument really wants to prove. In the inference at hand, it applies because even if the Advaitin successfully proves that the world has  $M^2$  (“the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexistence”), he has still not conclusively proved that the world does not exist. For, it is still possible that the world is “existent” by its very essence, without having the *property of* existence.

Vyāsātīrtha points out that the Advaitins themselves accept a case where something may lack the quality of existence but nevertheless still be said to “exist”: *brahman* itself. Although the Advaitins argue that *brahman* is really free from qualities, including existence, they still accept that it is existent by essence. Could not the same be said for the world? Can we not say that the world lacks both the qualities of existence and nonexistence, but is, nevertheless, essentially existent, as Vyāsātīrtha has already indicated he accepts?<sup>21</sup> In themselves, Ānandabodha’s inferences fail to rule out this contingency, and thus fail to prove conclusively that the world is “indeterminate”.

### Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)

[1]yac ca<sup>[1]</sup> [2]nirdharmakasya brahmaṇaḥ<sup>[2]</sup> sattvarāhitye ’pi<sup>[3]</sup> sadrūpavat<sup>[3]</sup> prapañcasya sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopapattiyārthāntaram uktam, tan na. ekenaiva sarvānugatena<sup>[4]</sup> sarvatra<sup>[4]</sup> satpratītyupapattau brahmavat<sup>[5]</sup> pratyekaṃ prapañcasya<sup>[5]</sup> satsvabhāvatākalpane mānābhāvāt, anugatavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgāc ca.

satpratītyogikāsatpratītyogikabhedadvayaṃ vā sādhyam. tathā cobhayātmakatve ’nyatarātmakatve vā tādṛgbhedāsambhavana tādhyām arthāntarānavakāśaḥ. (NAB: 54.)<sup>22</sup>

1. yat tu NAK
2. nirdharmakabrahmaṇaḥ K<sup>D</sup>
3. sadrūpatvavat ASv, NAK
4. sattvena sarvatra ASv (vl.), K<sup>D</sup>
5. prapañcasya pratyekaṃ ASMu, ASMy, NAK

<sup>21</sup> See above, TEXT 2.

<sup>22</sup> ASMu: 55–57; ASMy: 25–26; ASv: 39–41; K<sup>D</sup>: 3v; NAK: 103–107.

### Translation

[Vyāsatīrtha] has argued that just as [for us Advaitins] the quality-free *brahman* is existent by essence even though it lacks the quality of existence, the world too could be existent by essence [despite lacking the quality of existence], and would thus lack “illusoriness” [defined as  $M^2$ ]. This is wrong! For, it is possible to explain the cognitions we have that each thing in the world is existent by [postulating] just a single consecutive (*anugata*) thing[, i.e. the existent *brahman*, which is the substrate upon which those things are superimposed]. Hence there is no reason to postulate that, like *brahman*, each thing in the world is, individually, existent by essence. Moreover, [Vyāsatīrtha’s argument is wrong because were we to assume that each and every thing in the world is existent by essence,] it would follow that there could be no consecutive discourse (*anugatavyavahāra*) [which groups together distinct individuals as being “existent”].

Alternatively, let the probandum [in Ānandabodha’s inferences] consist in a pair of *differences*: the difference from what is existent, and the difference from what is nonexistent. Thus, if [the world] were essentially identical with both [what is existent and what is nonexistent], or with either one of [them], it could not have the relevant differences. Hence, there would be no scope for applying the flaw of *arthāntara*.

### Comments

Vyāsatīrtha has claimed that the Advaitins’ inferences fail to conclusively prove that the world is illusory/indeterminate. Even if the Advaitin succeeds in proving that the world has the absences of the *qualities* of existence and nonexistence, it might still be existent by its very essence, and thus not “indeterminate” as the Advaitin wants to prove. Madhusūdana responds to this objection by arguing that the claim that the world is “existent by essence” is not plausible, since this theory is simply unable to account for the fact of “consecutive discourse” (*anugatavyavahāra*).<sup>23</sup> “Consecutive discourse” refers to the fact that we frequently seem to attribute the same quality to numerically distinct individuals. According to Bagchi’s analysis in the *Bālabodhinī*, such discourse consists in a group of statements that attribute the same qualifier to different qualificanda through the same relationship. In other words, consecutive discourse consists in a group of statements of the form:

$x$  (qualificandum) is  $F$  (qualifier) by  $R$  (relationship).

<sup>23</sup> See above, Chapter 5, pp. 123–124, for a discussion of the different treatments of “consecutive discourse” among the Mādhvas, Naiyāyikas, and Advaitins. For a discussion of the analysis of consecutive characters in Navya-Nyāya, see Matilal (1968: 82–83).

The qualificandum ( $x$ ) is variable in each case: we can attribute the same qualifier to any number of different individuals (we can say that “the pot exists”, “the cloth exists”, and so on). However, Bagchi suggests that two things must remain constant in each case: (1) the qualifier itself ( $F$ ) and (2) the relator that relates the qualifier to the qualificandum ( $R$ ).

Why do we attribute the same property of “existence” to distinct individuals in this way? Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers explain this fact by claiming that “existence” (*sattā*) is a single universal (*jāti*) that is instantiated in these various individuals. We speak about substances, tropes, and motions all as being “existent” because they all instantiate the self-same property of existence. According to the Advaitins’ explanation, on the other hand, *brahman* itself, being essentially existent, is the singular existent thing that accounts for the fact that we cognise distinct individuals in the empirical world as existent. We speak of these individuals as being “existent” because they are superimposed on this substrate of pure being.

The Mādhvas reject both of these theories. According to them, we speak of the things in the world around us as “existent” not because they possess a singular universal property, or because they are somehow superimposed on *brahman*. The Mādhva theory is rather a pluralistic claim that each and every thing in the world is, individually, existent by its very essence. We speak of them all as being “existent” because of the innate similarity between them in this respect.

According to Madhusūdana, there is no real proof in favour of the Mādhva theory, and it is directly contradicted by the facts about how we speak and think. The Mādhva theory lacks proof because it is cumbersome in comparison to the Advaitins’ monistic stance. In explaining why we have the cognitions “the pot exists” (*ghaṭaḥ san*), “the cloth exists” (*paṭaḥ san*), and so on, the theory that *brahman* is existent by essence entails that we only need to postulate the existence of a single thing. By contrast, the theory that each and every thing in the world is, individually, existent means that we must postulate the existence of an incalculably large number of entities. Consequently, the Advaitins’ theory seems to have the advantage of parsimony over the Mādhvas’.

In fact, Madhusūdana believes that the Mādhva theory completely fails to account for the phenomenon of consecutive discourse. In theorising that each and every thing in the world is, individually, existent by essence, the Mādhva is effectively claiming that in each and every case where we refer to something as “existent”, the qualifier is a distinct property. How can this explain the fact that we refer to all of these diverse things as “existent”? Why should we group together numerically distinct individuals that share no common property? The Mādhvas’ pluralistic theory simply cannot account for our propensity to ascribe the property of “existence” to so many distinct individuals.

The upshot of all of this is that the charge of *arthāntara* cannot apply to Ānandabodha's inferences. What Vyāsātīrtha cites as a “contingency” which the inference fails to rule out is no contingency at all. The pluralistic claim that the individuals in the world are by their very essence existent is incompatible with the facts of our speech and thought and is superseded by the Advaitins' more parsimonious account of why this occurs.

Madhusūdana has a further line of argument against Vyāsātīrtha. In all three of his analyses of the compound *sadasattvānādhikaraṇatva*, Vyāsātīrtha has assumed that the word *anādhikaraṇa* should be interpreted as referring to constant absences (*atyantābhāva*). However, the term could also be interpreted to refer to mutual absences/differences (*anyonyābhāva/bheda*). Something may lack the quality *x*-ness and still “be” *x*; *brahman*, for instance, can lack the quality of existence (*sattva*) but nevertheless be existent by essence. However, something cannot be essentially the same as *x* and be different from *x*—something cannot be identical with something else and simultaneously have the mutual absence from that thing. Hence, if it is interpreted to refer to mutual absences/differences, the probandum *does* rule out the contingency that the world is existent by essence. Hence, argues Madhusūdana, Vyāsātīrtha is wrong to apply the flaw of *arthāntara* to Ānandabodha's inferences in this way.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*)

nirdharmaketi. ubhayābhāvasādhane 'pi brahmavat sadrūpatvānupamardād ity arthaḥ.

nanv ekenaiva sarvānugatenā sarvatra satpratītyupapattau brahmavat pratyekaṃ prapañcasya satsvabhāvatākalpane mātābhāvāt, anugatavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgāc ca. satpratītyogikāsatpratītyogikābhedadvayaṃ vā sādhyam. tathā cobhayātmakatve 'nyatarātmakatve vā tādr̥gbhedābhāvena tābhyām arthāntarānavakāśa itī <sup>[1]</sup>cet<sup>[1]</sup>.

maivam; rajataṃ vināpi śuktau rajatapratītyavyavahārādidarśanāt. satpadārthaṃ vināpi satpratītyāder upapattāv atilāghavam itī brahmāpi sadrūpaṃ na si-dhyet. pramitatvād brahma sadrūpaṃ itī tu jagaty api tulyam.

etenānekasatkalpanarūpabādhakatarkasahakṛtasattvābhāvānumānam eva sadrūpatvābhāve 'pi paryavasyatīti, na sadrūpatvenārthāntaram itī nirastam; tarkasya pramitasadrūpatvānapavādatvāt. anyathā sattvābhāvānumānasya lāgha-vena prātītikasattvābhāve 'pi <sup>[2]</sup>paryavasānena<sup>[2]</sup> jagat śūnyam eva syād itī sādḥuk-tam, arthāntarāc cetī.

sadasadubhayānyonyābhāvasya sādhyatāyām tu vyāhatisādhyavaikalyādir doṣo 'sty eva. (NAB: 56–57.)<sup>24</sup>

1. om. NAMu
2. paryavasāne NAK

### Translation

“Free from qualities ...” (*nirdharmaka*). For, even if [the Advaitin] establishes that [the world has] the absences of both [existence and nonexistence, he would not] have ruled out [the possibility that the world is,] like *brahman*, existent by essence. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means.

*Objection* (Madhusūdana): It is possible to explain the cognitions we have that each thing in the world is existent by [postulating] just a single consecutive (*anugata*) thing[, i.e. *brahman* itself], and hence there is no reason to postulate that, like *brahman*, each thing in the world is, individually, existent by essence. Moreover, [Vyāsātīrtha’s argument is wrong, because were we to assume that each and every thing in the world is existent by essence,] it would follow that there would not be consecutive discourse (*anugatavyavahāra*). Or, let the probandum [in Ānandabodha’s inferences] consist in a pair of differences: the difference from what is existent, and the difference from what is nonexistent. Thus, if [the world] were essentially identical with both [what is existent and what is nonexistent], or with either one of [them], it could not have the relevant differences. Hence, there is no scope for the flaw of *arthāntara*.

*Reply*: Wrong! For, [we] observe that even though there is no silver present in the mother-of-pearl, we still have a cognition of “silver”, as well as talking about [the “silver”, reaching to pick it up,] and so on. Since we can experience [and talk about] what is “existent” even in the absence of an existent thing, by stringent application of the principle of parsimony it would not even be established that *brahman* [itself] is existent by essence! If [you claim] that *brahman* is existent by essence because [it is] an object of knowledge, then the same could [be said] of the world [which is an object of knowledge, so far as we Mādhvas are concerned].

This same [reasoning] refutes the following argument—“There is no flaw of *arthāntara* on the ground that [the world] might be existent by essence. For, the inference to establish that [the world] lacks [the property of] existence—insofar as [that inference] is assisted by the hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) that rules out [the conclusion that the world is existent by essence, since that would entail] the postulation of numerous existent entities—ends up establishing that [the world]

<sup>24</sup> NAK: 103–105; NAMu: 11v.

is not existent by essence too.” For, this hypothetical reasoning cannot show that something which is an object of knowledge is not existent by essence. If it could, then since the inference that proves that [the world has] the absence of existence would, on the basis of parsimony, end up proving that [the world] lacks *practical* (*prāṭitika*) existence as well, it would follow that the world is simply void[, as the nihilistic Buddhists claim]! Therefore, it was proper [of Vyāsātīrtha] to say, “... and because [you are] guilty of failing to prove what you intended to prove” (*arthāntarāc ca*).

On the other hand, if[, as Madhusūdana has argued,] the probandum [can] consist in the mutual absences from both what is existent and what is nonexistent, then the flaws of contradiction, [the example’s] lacking-the-probandum, and so on still apply [to the inference].

### Comments

Rāmācārya here considers Madhusūdana’s response to Vyāsātīrtha’s charge of *arthāntara*. Madhusūdana’s response to Vyāsātīrtha was that the principle of parsimony rules out the Mādhva theory that the things that make up the empirical world are individually existent by essence. It is simply more parsimonious to assume that there is a single, existent substrate—*brahman* itself—that explains why we judge all the things in the world around us to be “existent”.

Rāmācārya responds to Madhusūdana’s argument with a *reductio ad absurdum*. A rigorous application of the principle of parsimony does not favour the Advaitins’ monistic position; it actually favours out-and-out nihilism! It seems to be a fact that we sometimes judge things to be present even where no such thing exists. So far as Mādhva philosophers are concerned, the case of the silver/mother-of-pearl confusion shows us that we can think and talk about “silver” even though no such object exists before our eyes. So, pushing the principle of parsimony to its logical conclusion, why should we assume that even *brahman* itself is existent by essence? Would it not be more parsimonious to assume that the various things in the world around us appear as existent even in the absence of an existent substrate? Parsimony thus seems to open the door to the nihilism of the *śūnyavādin*.

Rāmācārya shows how this objection applies to a more formal presentation of Madhusūdana’s argument. In themselves, Ānandabodha’s inferences simply prove that the world lacks the quality of “existence”. However, this inference is assisted by the further consideration that it is more parsimonious to explain our diverse perceptions of existence by postulating the existence of a single underlying property than it is to assume that the innumerable things that make up the world are each “existent by essence”. Aided by this hypothetical reasoning, the inference ends up

proving not just that the world lacks the quality of existence, but that it cannot be existent by essence either.

Rāmācārya argues that this formal presentation of the argument is also liable to the *reductio ad absurdum* just outlined. If Madhusūdana claims that hypothetical reasoning on the basis of parsimony could rule out the existence of something that is an object of knowledge, then Ānandabodha's inferences must surely end up proving the nihilist philosopher's position, not the Advaitins'. If we apply the principle of parsimony rigorously, then an inference to prove that the world lacks the quality of existence would ultimately end up proving that it lacks even the provisional, "practical" existence that the Advaitins ascribe to it. No entities are, after all, fewer than one!

Finally, Rāmācārya considers Madhusūdana's argument (above, TEXT 4) that "indeterminacy" could be interpreted to consist in mutual absences/differences rather than relational absences. He does not try to argue that *arthāntara* would apply in this case, but simply refers his Advaitin opponents to the range of other flaws that Vyāsātīrtha has cited against the inferences in the PMBh.

## 9.5 TEXT 5: The Advaitin's conclusion is already established.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

"pṛthivī itarabhinnā, pṛthivītvāt" ity atra trayodaśānyonyābhāvānām ivātrāpi<sup>[1]</sup> sattvāsattvātyantābhāvayoḥ<sup>[1]</sup> pratyekaṃ prasiddhatvena katham cid aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvābhāve 'py asattvātyantābhāvāṃśe siddhasāadhanāc ca. na hi siddham asiddhena<sup>[2]</sup> sahoccaritam<sup>[2]</sup> asiddham bhavati.

"pṛthivī itarabhinnā ..." ity atra tu jalādyekaikānyonyābhāvo 'pi na pṛthivītvopahite siddhaḥ. (NAB: 53.)<sup>25</sup>

1. sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantābhāvayoḥ NAK

2. sahocyamānam NAMu (vI.)

### Translation

Let it be that, *somehow*, [adopting  $M^2$  as the definition of "illusoriness"] does not lead to [the subject in Ānandabodha's inferences] having an unestablished qualifier/[probandum] (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*). For, in those [inferences], the constant absences of existence and nonexistence could [already] be established separately

25 NAMu: 24v–25r; NAK: 105–110.

[in what is nonexistent and what is existent, respectively], just as in the case of the [universal-negative] inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories], because [it has] earthness”, where the thirteen mutual absences [of earth from the remaining substances and categories are established in different locations before the inference is made]. Nevertheless, [ $M^2$  is not tenable as a definition of “illusoriness”] because [if you adopt it as the probandum in your inferences, then you are] proving something that is already established [to me, the Mādhva,] in that part [of the probandum] that consists in the constant absence of nonexistence[, since I already accept that the world lacks nonexistence]. For, what is established does not become unestablished simply because it is mentioned alongside something that is unestablished!<sup>26</sup>

[It might be objected that, in that case, the same flaw of partial-*siddhasādhana* would apply to the earth-inference also, since the thirteen mutual absences that make up its probandum could be established in one part of the subject—an earthen pot, for instance—prior to the inference being made.] However, unlike [in Ānandabodha's inferences], in the case of the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”, each individual mutual absence from water and so on is *not* established in something that possesses earthness [before the inference takes place, and hence the flaw of *siddhasādhana* does *not* apply to the inference].

### Comments

Although Vyāsātīrtha believes that  $M^2$  and  $M^3$  suffer from a common set of flaws, he also believes they individually suffer from the flaws of “proving something that is already established” (*siddhasādhana*), and “[the subject's] having-an-unestablished-qualifier/probandum” (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*), respectively. Vyāsātīrtha now argues that if the Advaitin adopts  $M^2$  as his analysis of “indeterminacy”/“illusoriness”, then Ānandabodha's inferences prove, in part, something that the Mādhvas already accept.

Vyāsātīrtha assumes, *arguendo*, that if  $M^2$  is adopted as the analysis of “indeterminacy”, then indeterminacy is not an “unestablished” (*aprasiddha*) property. He finds precedent for this judgment in Gaṅgeśa's analysis of the universal-negative inference “Earth is different from the remaining substances and categories, since it has earthness”. The inference establishes that the substance earth is different from all the remaining substances and categories accepted in Vaiśeṣika ontology, because it possesses the natural kind “earthness”. The probandum (“being different from the rest” [*itarabhinnavatva*]) therefore consists in thirteen differences/mutual absences

<sup>26</sup> This is a quote from Jayatīrtha's *ṭīkā* on Madhva's *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana*. Cf. MAKh: 3.

from the substances other than earth, and the remaining categories besides substance.

Like the probandum in the earth-inference,  $M^2$  is a “partite”/complex probandum. It consists of two distinct qualities which can exist separately from one another: the constant absence of existence, and the constant absence of nonexistence. Vyāsatīrtha here accepts that the probandum in the earth-inference is not an unestablished property. It is true that the thirteen mutual absences comprising the probandum in the earth-inference cannot be established in a single location prior to the inference, because nothing apart from earth can have that particular combination of absences that render earth “different from everything else”. However, each of the mutual absences that make up the probandum could be *individually* established among the substances and categories besides earth before the inference takes place. Thus, it follows that the probandum *can* be established prior to the inference being made.

Similarly, one could argue that the two absences making up  $M^2$  can be individually established before the inference is made. As Śrīnivāsatīrtha points out, the constant absence of nonexistence is established in things that exist and, vice versa, the constant absence of existence is established in nonexistent things. Thus one could argue that the probandum is established before the inference takes place, even if both of its parts have not been apprehended as sharing a common locus. Ānandabodha’s inferences might not, therefore, suffer from the flaw of *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇatā*. Nevertheless, Vyāsatīrtha argues that the inferences would still partially prove something that the Mādhvas accept. As realists, the Mādhvas already accept that the world lacks nonexistence. Hence, one part of the Advaitin’s probandum is quite superfluous: he is trying to persuade the Mādhva of something he already accepts.

One objection to this argument is that the earth-inference, which Vyāsatīrtha accepts as valid throughout this chapter, could also be said to suffer from the flaw of partial *siddhasādhana* if this reasoning is accepted. If the thirteen mutual absences that make up the probandum in that inference are already established prior to the inference’s being made, then why is the Naiyāyika not guilty of proving something that is already established? Vyāsatīrtha argues that this is not an apt comparison. In Ānandabodha’s inference, the constant absence of nonexistence is already established for the Mādhva in the world; in the case of the earth-inference, the thirteen absences are only established in the substances/categories *apart from* earth. There is thus no need for them to be established in something that possesses the universal earthness (a pot for instance) before the inference is made.

### Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)

na cāsattvavyatirekāṃśasyāsadbhedasya ca prapañce siddhatvenāṃśataḥ siddhasādhnam iti vācyam.

“guṇādikam guṇyādinā bhinnābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt” iti bhedābheda-vādiprayoge tārikikādyāṅgīkṛtasya bhinnatvasya siddhāv apy uddeśyapratīty\* asiddher yathā na siddhasādhnam, tathā prakṛte 'pi militapratīter uddeśyatvān na siddhasādhnam.

<sup>[1]</sup>yathā<sup>[1]</sup> <sup>[2]</sup>tattvābhede<sup>[2]</sup> ghaṭaḥ kumbha iti sāmānādhikaraṇyapratīter\* adarśanena militasiddhir uddeśyā, tathā prakṛte 'pi sattvarahite tucche dṛśyatvādarśanena militasya tatprayojakatayā militasiddhir uddeśyeti samānam. (NAB: 54.)<sup>27</sup>

1. yathā ca ASv, NAK

2. tatrābhede ASv

\* Portion missing from KP

### Translation

*Objection* (Vyāsātīrtha): Since it is already established [to me] that the world has both [(a)] the part [of the probandum] consisting in the absence of nonexistence and [(b)] the difference from what is nonexistent[, your inferences] prove, in part, something that [I] already accept.

*Reply*: [You] cannot argue as such! Take, for instance, the inference: “Tropes and [other properties] are both different and non-different from things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [they are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]”.<sup>28</sup> This inference is employed by the [Mīmāṃsakas, Mādhvas, and other] proponents of the doctrine that [tropes/other properties, on the one hand, and their substrates, on the other,] are both different and non-different from one another[, against the Naiyāyika, who accepts that they are entirely different from each other. In that inference], even though the state of “being-different” (*bhinnatva*) [belonging to tropes and the things that possess them], being accepted by the Naiyāyikas, is already established [for them], the flaw of proving[, in part,] something that is already established is *not* applicable. For, the judgment that the [inference] is intended to give rise to has not [already] been brought about [on the part of the Naiyāyikas]. Similarly, in the case at hand[, i.e. Ānandabodha's inferences], since the objective [of the inferences] is to produce a

<sup>27</sup> ASMu: 57–78; ASMy: 26–40; ASv: 42–46; KP: 3v–4r; NAK: 107–142.

<sup>28</sup> The manuscript KP (folio 3v) gives the following marginal gloss on the reason (*sāmānādhikṛtatvāt*) in the inference: *abhedasaṃsargakadhivīṣayatvayogyatvād ity arthaḥ*.

judgment that a compound entity (*milita*) [consisting of the compound of the absences of existence and nonexistence is present in the subject], the flaw of proving[, in part,] something that is already established is not applicable.

[In the case of the *bhedābheda*-inference,] the objective is to establish a compound entity[, i.e. “difference-combined-with-non-difference”], because [we] observe no judgment involving grammatical apposition in cases of things that are not different from one another, e.g., [we do not say,] “Pot (*ghaṭa*) is pot (*kalaśa*)”. The same is the case in the present [inference to prove that the world is illusory because it is perceptible]. For, since [the reason in this inference,] “perceptibility”, is absent from everything that is absolutely nonexistent, it is the compound entity [consisting of the combination of the absences of existence and nonexistence] that determines [the reason, i.e. perceptibility]. Hence, the goal [of the inference] is to establish [that this] compound entity [is present in the world].

### Comments

Madhusūdana now responds to Vyāsātīrtha’s argument that Ānandabodha’s inferences partly prove something that is already established to the Mādhyas. Madhusūdana employs a line of argument which Vyāsātīrtha will explore later in the PMBh (see below, TEXT 9). Madhusūdana’s argument is essentially that while the probandum ( $M^2$ ) in the inferences is a partite one and consists of two separate qualities, the cognition that the inferences seek to give rise to is, by contrast, one that has a compound entity (*milita*) for its object. He uses the following inference as precedent here:

“Tropes and [other properties] are both different and non-different from the things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [tropes and other properties are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]” (*guṇādikam guṇyādīnā bhinnābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt*).

This inference can be analysed as follows:

- *Subject*: “Tropes and [other properties]” (*guṇādikam*);
- *Probandum*: “Both different and non-different from the things that possess tropes and [other properties]” (*guṇyādīnā bhinnābhinnam*);
- *Reason*: “Since [tropes and other properties] are placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]” (*samānādhikṛtatvāt*).

This inference captures a controversy between the Buddhists, Sāṅkhyas, Vaiyākaraṇas, and Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand, and the Naiyāyikas on the other. The question is whether entities that inhere in their substrates (for the Naiyāyikas tropes, motions, and natural kinds) are different or non-different from those substrates.

Whereas the Naiyāyikas maintained that such properties are completely different (*bhinna*) from their substrates, the Mīmāṃsakas and others<sup>29</sup> argued that the fact that we place them in grammatical apposition (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) to one another when speaking about them demonstrates that properties and their substrates are *both* different *and* non-different from one another. Importantly for Madhusūdana's argument, the Mādhvas themselves are committed to the standpoint of the Mīmāṃsakas *et al.*, and Mādhva philosophers employed this very inference in their own works to prove their position against the Naiyāyikas.

Consider the judgment, "Pot is dark blue" (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*). The property here is the colour-trope "dark blue", and the substance that possesses this trope is some pot. In the judgment, the dark blue colour and the pot are placed in grammatical apposition to one another. "Grammatical apposition" usually refers to the placing of two or more words in the same case ending (*samānavibhakti*). According to *bhedābheda*vādins like the Mīmāṃsakas, the fact that we refer to them using this grammatical structure demonstrates that the dark blue trope and the pot can be neither identical with, nor totally different from, one another. We do not employ grammatical apposition in cases of words that refer to the same thing (we do not say, for example, that, "Pot is pot [*ghaṭaḥ kalaśaḥ*]"). Nor do we employ such a construction in the case of two things that are *completely different* from one another; we do not say, for instance, "Cow is horse" (*gaur aśvaḥ*). We only employ this grammatical construction in the case of things that are *both* different *and* non-different from one another.

The Naiyāyikas, who accept that tropes and so on are simply different from the substrates in which they inhere, already accept one component of the probandum in this inference. However, they do not accept the complete conclusion of the inference, and so the cognition that the inference is employed to produce (the *uddeśyapratīti*) has not already been brought about before the inference takes place. The Naiyāyika does not accept that tropes are both different and non-different from one another; hence there is no reason why their prior acceptance that tropes and their substrates are differentiated from one another should block the inference. The Mādhvas themselves, as *bhedābheda*vādins, must surely accept the validity of this inference.

The same can be said of Ānandabodha's inferences to prove that the world is indeterminate, Madhusūdana argues. The Advaitin's goal in making these inferences is to produce a cognition of a "compound thing" (*milita*), consisting of the constant absence of nonexistence combined with the constant absence of existence. Consequently, as in the case of the *bhedābheda*vādin's inference, the fact that his Mādhva

<sup>29</sup> Bagchi (ASV: 45) attributes this view to "the Buddhists, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhyas, the followers of Patañjali, the Mādhvas, and others".

opponent already accepts one part of the probandum should not serve to stop the inference from proving to them that the world is indeterminate.

Vyāsātīrtha himself notes later in this chapter (TEXT 9) that there might be a different reason that the *bhedābhedavādin*'s inference must seek to give rise to a cognition of a compound entity. Madhusūdāna reproduces Vyāsātīrtha's argument in the present passage of the *Advaitasiddhi*. Let us suppose that the probandum in the *bhedābhedavādin* inference were simply "non-differentiatedness" (*abhinnatva*). In that case, the inference would read:

Tropes and [other properties] are non-different from the things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [tropes and other properties are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them] (*guṇādikaṃ guṇyādinābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt*).

In this case, the probandum ("non-differentiatedness") would no longer pervade the reason (the quality of being placed in grammatical apposition); Madhusūdāna says that the probandum would no longer "be determinative" (*prayojakatā*) of the reason. For, we do not employ grammatical apposition in respect of things that are identical to one another. We do not say, for instance, "Pot (*ghaṭa*) is pot (*kalaśa*)". Hence, to ensure that the inference is valid, the *bhedābhedavādin* has to add the state of "being differentiated" (*bhinnava*) to the probandum, even though the beneficiary of the inference (the Naiyāyika) already accepts this part of the proof.

Madhusūdāna argues in the present passage that the same can be said of the *mithyātva*-inference. The Advaitin accepts that absolutely nonexistent things (the "hare's horn" and the like) can never be an object of cognition. Consequently, if the probandum consisted simply in the constant absence of existence (*sattvātyantābhāva*), the probandum would no longer pervade the reason and the inference would be defective. Madhusūdāna argues that like the *bhedābhedavādin*, the Advaitin thus has no choice but to establish a compound entity consisting of the constant absences of both existence and nonexistence, even though the Mādhva might already accept that the world has the latter property.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 1)

trayodaśeti. abhāvam anantarbhāvyā trayodaśatvaṃ bodhyam. kathaṃ cid iti. anumitiviśayasyobhayābhāvarūpasya sādhyasyaikasminn adhikaraṇe prasiddhyābhāve 'pi pratyekādhikaraṇa ubhayābhāvaprasiddhir ity arthaḥ.

asattvātyantābhāvāṃśa iti. yathā pakṣatāvaccchedakanānātve kva cid adhikaraṇe pakṣatāvaccchedakāvaccchedena sādhyasiddher jātātvaṃ tatpakṣaṃśe siddhasādhanaṃ, tathā sādhyatāvaccchedakanānātve 'pi siddhasādhyāṃśe siddhasādhanaṃ

eva; sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasya pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena siddhirūpa-sya siddhasāadhanabījasyobhayatrāpi tulyatvād ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 57.)<sup>30</sup>

### Translation

“Thirteen ...” (*trayodaśa*). It should be understood that there are thirteen [substances and categories] not including [the category of] absence. “Somehow ...” (*katham cit*). What [Vyāsātīrtha] means is that even though the probandum, comprising the absences of both [existence and nonexistence], which is the object of the inferential awareness [that Ānandabodha’s inferences seek to generate], is not established in a single location [before the inferences take place], both absences are established to exist in *separate locations* [prior to the inference].

“In the part [of the probandum] comprising the constant absence of nonexistence ...” (*asattvātyantābhāvāmśa*). What [Vyāsātīrtha] means is as follows: If more than one [property] determines subjecthood [in an inference], then if it has already been established that the probandum [in that inference] is determined by a determiner of subjecthood in some locus or other, then [that inference] proves something that is already established [to its beneficiary] concerning that part of the subject. Likewise, if more than one property determines *probandumhood* [in an inference], then [that inference] is proving something that is already established in respect of that part of the probandum that is [already] established. For, the root of the flaw of “proving something that is already established” (*siddhasādhana*)—the fact that something that is qualified by a determiner of probandumhood has [already] been established to be determined by a determiner of subjecthood—is equally present in both cases.

### Comments

Rāmācārya here gives a technical discussion of under what circumstances the flaw of *siddhasādhana* can be applied to an inference. He finds precedent in the fact that the flaw applies to an inference where subjecthood (*pakṣatā*) is determined by multiple properties. An example of such an inference which Vyāsātīrtha himself will give below (TEXT 8) is the inference “Speech and mind are noneternal, because they are products”. The beneficiary of this inference is presumably a Naiyāyika who is already persuaded that “speech is noneternal”, but who is not convinced that “mind is noneternal”.

In this inference, there is more than one property that determines subjecthood. The inference asserts something of both speech and mind, so probandumhood could

<sup>30</sup> NAK: 105–106; NATMu: 11v–12r.

be said to be determined by both “speechness” and “mindness”. In this case, it is already known to the beneficiary of the inference (the Naiyāyika) that “Speech, in general, is noneternal”. This could be expressed by saying that the probandum (noneternality) has been established as being “determined by a determiner of subjecthood (i.e. speechness)”. So, when the inference is adduced, it ends up proving something that is already established for the Naiyāyika, at least in connection with that part of the probandum.

Rāmācārya reasons by analogy that the same flaw applies to an attempted inference if there are multiple properties that determine *probandumhood* as opposed to subjecthood in that inference. If the Advaitin adopts M<sup>2</sup> as the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences, then one part of the probandum is already established to be determined by a determiner of subjecthood. For, as a realist, the Mādhva already accepts that the entire domain referred to as “the world” lacks the quality of being nonexistent.

Rāmācārya concludes that in both of the inferences under consideration, *siddhasādhana* applies because something that is qualified by a determiner of probandumhood has already been established as being determined by a determiner of subjecthood. From the Naiyāyika’s perspective, “noneternality” is established to be present in everything that has speechness, and, from the Mādhva’s perspective, the “constant absence of nonexistence” is established to be present in the world in its entirety. So both inferences are proving, at least partially, something that is already established to the party who is meant to benefit from them, and they are thus invalid.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtatarāṅginī*, 2)

nanu sādhyatāvachedakanānātve 'py ubhayābhāvagocarasamūhālambanarūpāikānumity<sup>[1]</sup>uddeśe<sup>[1]</sup> nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam, asattvātyantābhāvāṃśe 'py uddeśyāyāḥ samūhālambanarūpāyāḥ siddher ajātatvāt. anumitidvayoddeśe ca siddhasāadhanam eva, nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam. na caivaṃ pakṣatāvachedakanānātve 'py uktavidhayā nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam iti vācyam, iṣṭāpatter iti cet;

satyam. samūhālambanānumityuddeśyatva eva tasyā asattvābhāvāṃśe pakṣatāvachedakāvachedena siddhaṃ yat<sup>[2]</sup>sādhyatāvachedakāvacchinna<sup>[2]</sup>sādhyam, tad<sup>[3]</sup>viśayaka<sup>[3]</sup>siddhirūpatvena siddhasāadhanatvābhidhānam ity adoṣaḥ. (NAB: 57.)<sup>31</sup>

1. uddeśena NAB, NAK

<sup>31</sup> NAK: 108; NATMu: 12r.

2. sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaṃ NAK
3. viṣaya NAT<sub>Mu</sub>

### Translation

*Objection* (Advaitin): Even if more than one property determines probandumhood [in Ānandabodha's inferences], since the objective [of the inferences] is to produce an inferential awareness in the form of a collective cognition that has the absences of both [existence and nonexistence] for its object, there is not the flaw of proving, in part, something that is already established [to you, the Mādhva]. For, the collective cognition that [the inferences] seek to generate has not already been brought about [on the part of the Mādhva], even from the point of view of that part [of the probandum] that consists in the constant absence of nonexistence. And, if the objective [of Ānandabodha's inferences] is to produce two [separate] inferential awarenesses, then [those inferences] are simply proving something that is already established, and not proving *in part* something that is already established[, since one of those two inferential awarenesses—i.e. the one that concludes that the world has the constant absence of nonexistence—is already established to us Mādhvas]. And do not argue that if [one] accepts this reasoning then the flaw of proving, in part, something that is already established would not apply even if multiple properties determine subjecthood [in an inference]. For, [we] welcome this consequence!

*Reply*: It is true [that the flaw of partial-*siddhasādhana* does not apply if Ānandabodha's inferences seek to produce two separate inferential awarenesses]. However, there is no fault [in Vyāsatīrtha's claim that Ānandabodha's inferences prove, in part, something that is already established]. For, what [Vyāsatīrtha] is claiming is that *siddhasādhana* [applies to Ānandabodha's inferences] because [they establish] that the probandum qualified by a determiner of probandumhood is [already] established to be determined by the determiner of subjecthood in respect of the part [of the probandum] comprising the absence of nonexistence, *only if* the objective [of those inferences] is to produce a collective inferential awareness [that encompasses both the absences of existence and nonexistence].

### Comments

Rāmācārya now considers a potential objection to Vyāsatīrtha's charge of *siddhasādhana*. The Advaitin objector here believes that the Mādhvas are caught in a dilemma. Just what type of cognition is it that Ānandabodha's inferences are supposed to bring about on the part of the realist philosopher? On the one hand, we might assume that the mental event these inferences are intended to produce is a "collective" (*samūhālabhāna*) cognition, which aggregates the two components of

the probandum (M<sup>2</sup>)—the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexistence—in a single mental judgment. On the other hand, we could conclude that the inferences seek to generate *two separate* inferential awarenesses, which judge the world to lack existence and nonexistence, respectively.

In the first case, it might be argued that *siddhasādhana* does not apply. The Mādhvas already believe that the world has the constant absence of nonexistence, but they have not arrived at this judgment as part of a collective cognition that attributes that property to the world together with the constant absence of nonexistence. On the other hand, if the inference is taken to produce two separate inferential awarenesses, then the inference is simply proving something that has already been established to the Mādhva, and there is no reason to speak about “partial” *siddhasādhana* as Vyāsātīrtha has done. For, in that case the Mādhva is already convinced of the truth of the full contents of one of those awarenesses, i.e. the one that judges the world to lack nonexistence.

Rāmācārya does not try to respond to the latter alternative here. He appears to concede that if the inferences seek to give rise to two separate inferential awarenesses, then the flaw of partial-*siddhasādhana* cannot apply. However, Rāmācārya insists that (partial) *siddhasādhana* does apply if the inferences seek to produce a collective cognition, and he claims that in the *Nyāyāmṛta* Vyāsātīrtha only applies the flaw under this assumption. Assuming that the inferences seek to produce a single, collective judgment, then there are two parts to that judgment: the part comprising the absence of existence, and the part comprising the absence of nonexistence. In the part of the probandum comprising the absence of nonexistence, it is already established to the Mādhva that the constant absence of nonexistence is determined by the determiner of subjecthood. That is, it is established to the Mādhva that the constant absence of nonexistence is present throughout the domain that is referred to as the “world”. Thus the inferential awareness, which has that part of the probandum for its object, is proving in part something that is already established to Mādhva philosophers.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 3)

nanv apekṣābuddhiviṣayatvāder vyāsaivyavṛttidharmasya sādhyatāvacchedakatāyāṃ nāmśataḥ siddhasāadhanam. ata evānupadam eva vakṣyati—sādhyatāvacchedakaikyān nāmśe siddhasāadhanam itīti cet, satyam. tatra vyāhatyādir eva doṣo bodhyaḥ.

nanu sādhyakoṭiniviṣṭasyāsattvātyantābhāvasya pakṣe <sup>[1]</sup>siddhau<sup>[1]</sup> yadi siddhasāadhanam, tadā “pṛthivītarabhinnā” ity atra trayodaśānyonyābhāvānām api

ghaṭo na jalādir iti <sup>[2]</sup>pr̥thivītvavati<sup>[2]</sup> pratītyā ghaṭādaṁ siddheḥ sutarāṁ siddhasādhanaṁ syād ity ata āha—<sup>[3]</sup>pr̥thivīti<sup>[3]</sup>.

pr̥thivītvopahita iti. ghaṭādibhinnap̥rthivītvopahita ity arthaḥ. yathāśrute trayodaśānyonyābhāvānāṁ pr̥thivītvāsāmānādhikaraṇasyāpi ghaṭādaṁ siddhyokta-doṣatādavasthyāt. (NA<sub>B</sub>: 57.)<sup>32</sup>

1. siddhyā NA<sub>K</sub>
2. *om.* NA<sub>K</sub>, NAT<sub>Mu</sub>
3. *om.* NA<sub>K</sub>

### Translation

*Objection:* If a single collectively-present (*vyāsajyavṛtti*) property—“being the object of an aggregating cognition” (*apekṣābuddhiviśayatva*), for instance—is the property that determines subjecthood, then [Ānandabodha’s inferences] do *not* prove, in part, something that is already established [to the Mādhva]. Thus will [Vyāsatīrtha himself] say word-for-word—“Since there is only a single determiner of probandumhood, there is not the flaw of proving, in part, something that is already established”. *Reply:* True enough! In that case, pay mind to the [other faults cited by Vyāsatīrtha against M<sup>2</sup> in this chapter], that is, contradiction and so on.

*Objection:* Let us assume that [Ānandabodha’s inferences can be said] to prove something that is already established [simply] on the ground that the constant absence of nonexistence, which is added on to the end of the probandum, is [already] established in the subject [from the Mādhva’s point of view]. In that case, the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”, must *a fortiori* prove something that is already established [for its beneficiary]. For, [before the inference takes place] the thirteen mutual absences [from the substances and categories apart from earth] are established in the pot, etc., which possesses earthness, on the basis of cognitions such as, “Pot is not water [or any of the remaining twelve categories and substances]”. In response to this objection, Vyāsatīrtha says—“Earth ...”.

“In what possesses earthness ...” (*pr̥thivītvopahita*). What [Vyāsatīrtha] means by this expression is: “In [some] locus of earthness *that is different* from a pot and so on”. For, if [Vyāsatīrtha’s expression] were taken literally, then since it is established in the pot and so on that the thirteen mutual absences share a common locus with earthness, the stated flaw [of proving, in part, something that is already established,] would still apply [to the earth-inference].

32 NA<sub>K</sub>: 108–110; NAT<sub>Mu</sub>: 12r.

### Comments

The arguments that Rāmācārya has so far considered in connection with M<sup>2</sup> in this part of the *Taraṅginī* all assume that if we treat “indeterminacy” as a pair of separate properties, then the probandumhood in Ānandabodha’s inferences must be determined by multiple properties. That is, the properties “being the constant absence of existence” (*sattvātyantābhāvatva*) and “being the constant absence of nonexistence” (*asattvātyantābhāvatva*) both determine probandumhood. One could argue, however, that probandumhood here is determined by a single property that is present in both of these things. One could say, for instance, that the absences of existence and nonexistence only become the probandum when they are grasped in a single collective cognition that apprehends them both at the same time. In that case, the determiner of probandumhood could be said to be the quality of “being grasped in a single aggregating cognition” (*apekṣābuddhiviṣayatva*).

The quality of being an object of such a cognition is considered by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers to be a “collectively-present” quality: it is connected with multiple distinct individuals, but it is not completely present in any single one of them. It is only completely present in the aggregate of those individuals. The problem with all of this is that Vyāsātīrtha himself will go on to concede (see below, TEXT 8) that if the probandumhood in an inference is determined by only one property, then partial *siddhasādhana* cannot apply to it. Rāmācārya does not try to dispute this objection, but simply points out that the various other flaws Vyāsātīrtha has cited would still apply to the inference in that case.

The final problem that Rāmācārya considers here is that if we accept that *siddhasādhana* applies to Ānandabodha’s inferences for the reasons outlined, then it follows that the earth-inference might be taken to be invalid based on the very same reasoning. Vyāsātīrtha has argued that because a single one of the absences that make up the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences is established before the inference takes place, the inferences must be dismissed as proving something that is already established. In the earth-inference, however, it might be argued that the entire set of mutual absences that make up the probandum are established in at least some members of the class of things we call “earth” before the inference takes place. We might observe in the case of some individual substance composed of earth atoms—an earthen pot, for instance—that it is different from the various other substances before the inference takes place.

In the *Nyāyāmṛta*, Vyāsātīrtha simply says, without further explanation, that the absences making up the probandum in the earth-inference cannot be established in any locus of earthness before the inference takes place. Rāmācārya argues here that we must interpret Vyāsātīrtha’s expression elliptically, as claiming that those absences are not established to be present in any part of earth *besides* the earthen pot before the inference takes place. Rāmācārya is not particularly clear

about what he means by this interpretation. Presumably, he means to argue that the fact that the probandum is already established in *one part* of the subject before the earth-inference takes place should not stop the inference from proving that earth *in general* has the individual absences that comprise its probandum.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakaṇṭhakodhāra*, 1)

kathaṃ cid aprasiddheti. abhāvadvayasyaikasminn adhikaraṇe prasiddhyabhāve 'pi bhinnāśraye prasiddhatvād ity āśayena kathaṃ cid ity uktam iti bhāvaḥ.

asattvātyantābhāvāmśa iti. nanu pakṣatāvaccchedakāvaccchedenoddeśyasiddhau hi siddhasāadhanatā. evaṃ ca prakṛta ubhayābhāvagocarasamūhālambanānumiter uddeśyatvena nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam, uddeśyāyāḥ samūhālambanānumiter ajātatvāt. anumitidvayoddeśyatve ca siddhasāadhanam eva, nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam. tathā cāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanodbhāvam ayuktam. ... (NAB: 61.)

### Translation

“Somehow unestablished ...” (*kathaṃ cid aprasiddha*). For, even though the pair of absences [comprising the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexistence] are not established in any one location [prior to the inference's taking place], they *are* [already] established in separate locations. With this in mind [Vyāsātīrtha] says: “Somehow ...” (*kathaṃ cit*). This is the idea [behind Vyāsātīrtha's words here].

“In the part [of the probandum] comprising the constant absence of nonexistence ...” (*asattvātyantābhāvāmśe*). *Objection*: The flaw of proving something that is already established applies only when the thing that [the inference in question] seeks to prove is [already] established to be determined by the determiner of subjecthood [from the point of view of the beneficiary of the inference]. And so, in the case at hand, since the objective [of Ānandabodha's inferences] is [to produce] a collective (*samūhālambana*) inferential knowledge that has the absences of both [existence and nonexistence] for its object, there is not the flaw of proving, in part, something that is already established [to you Mādhvas]. For, the thing that [the inference] seeks to give rise to—the [aforementioned] collective inferential knowledge—has not been produced [prior to the inference's taking place]. And, if the objective [of the inference is to produce] *two separate* inferential awarenesses, then there is simply the flaw of proving what is already established, and not the flaw of proving *in part* what is already established. Thus it is wrong to apply the charge of proving, in part, something that is already established [to Ānandabodha's inferences]. ...

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakaṇṭhakodhāra*, 2)**

... iti maivam. sādhyatāvacchedakanānātvena sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasyai-  
kasya sādhyasya pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena siddhau siddhasāadhanam syād  
eva.

na ca samūhālambanānumiter uddeśyatvāt, uddeśyāsiddhau katham siddha-  
sāadhanam iti vācyam. pratyekānumiter uddeśyatvena samūhālambanānumiter ud-  
deśyatvābhāvāt.

na ca tathātve sampūrṇasiddhasāadhanasyaiva sambhavana katham aṃśataḥ  
siddhasāadhanābhīdhānam iti vācyam. sādhyadvaya ekasādhyasya siddhatvābhi-  
prāyeṇa tathābhīdhānāt. (NAb: 61.)

**Translation**

... *Reply*: This is wrong! For, [if  $M^2$  is the probandum in Ānandabodha's inferences,]  
then multiple properties determine probandumhood [because the qualities of  
*sattvātyantābhāvatva* and *asattvātyantābhāvatva* both determine it]. Hence, if  
one [of the two] probanda, being qualified by a determiner of probandumhood, is  
established to be determined by the determiner of subjecthood, then the flaw of  
proving what is already established does indeed apply.

*Objection*: Since the inferences seek to produce a collective awareness [that at-  
tributes both the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexis-  
tence to the world], and since this has not been established [prior to the inferences'  
taking place], how can [the inferences] prove something that is already established?

*Reply*: Do not argue as such! For, since [the inferences] seek to bring about [two  
distinct] inferential awarenesses that separately [ascribe the two probanda to the  
subject, those inferences] do not seek to bring about a collective cognition [which  
ascribes both of those properties to the world].

*Objection*: If that is so, then the flaw of proving something that is already estab-  
lished *in full* [and not in part] would apply [to Ānandabodha's inferences]. So why  
do you claim that the flaw of proving *in part* something that is already established  
applies? *Reply*: This is wrong! For this claim was made on the ground that a single  
probandum out of a pair of probanda is already established [to us Mādhvas].

**Comments**

In these two texts, Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka responds to essentially the same argument  
against the charge of *siddhasādhana* that Rāmācārya considered in the correspond-  
ing part of the *Taraṅginī* (above, NAT 2). According to this argument, the flaw of  
*siddhasādhana* cannot be applied to Ānandabodha's inferences, since they seek to  
generate a collective awareness that the world is both existence and nonexistent.

The Mādhva has not already arrived at this conclusion, so how could the inferences prove something that is already established to him? Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka insists in these passages that the objective of Ānandabodha's inferences cannot be to produce a collective inferential knowledge. Rather, the inferences must produce two separate inferential awarenesses which ascribe each absence to the world separately. This of course leaves him with the problem of explaining why Vyāsātīrtha cited the flaw of proving *in part* something that is already established (*aṃśataḥ siddhasādhana*) rather than full-blown *siddhasādhana*. His response is to argue that the term *aṃśataḥ* should be taken to refer to a single member of a pair of probanda, rather than one component of a partite probandum.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtakaṇṭhakodhāra*, 3)

yat tv aṃśe siddhasādhanaparihārārtham uktam, “guṇādikam guṇyādinā bhinnā-bhinnam” iti atreva viśiṣṭapratīter uddeśyatvān nāṃśe siddhasādhanam iti, tan na. tatrābhede sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvena viśiṣṭapratīter uddeśyatvasambhāvāt. prakṛte ca sattvābhāvavati tucche dṛśyatvasya vidyamānatvena taduddeśyatvābhāvāt.

na ca tucche dṛśyatvam eva neti vācyam. jñānaviśayatvarūpadṛśyatvasya tucche 'sattve 'sadvailakṣaṇyajñānādyanupapatter mūla eva uktatvena tucche dṛśyatvasyāvaśyakatvāt; dṛśyatvāntarasya hetūkaraṇāsambhavasyāgre 'bhīdhāsyamānatvāt. tasmād aṃśataḥ siddhasādhanam durvāram. (NAB: 62.)

### Translation

*Objection:* Now, [Madhusūdana] has said the following to avert the flaw of proving in part something that is already established: “Just like in the inference ‘Tropes and so on are both different and non-different from the things that possess tropes and so on[, since tropes are placed in grammatical apposition with the things that possess them]’, the goal [of Ānandabodha’s inferences] is to produce a cognition of a qualified entity [i.e. the “constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the constant absence of existence”]. Hence the flaw of partial-*siddhasādhana* does not apply [to our inferences]”.

*Reply:* This is wrong! In [the inference to prove that tropes are both different and non-different from their substrates,] the objective must be to produce a cognition of a qualified entity, since [the reason]—“being placed in grammatical apposition”—is absent in the case of [things that are] non-different [from one another; we do not say “Pot (*ghaṭaḥ*) is pot (*kalaśaḥ*)”, for instance]. In the inference at hand, however, since [the reason]—perceptibility—is present in what is absolutely nonexistent, which is devoid of existence [(which is the second component of the

probandum)], it follows that the inference cannot seek to produce [a cognition of the absence of nonexistence qualified by existence].

Nor can it be argued that perceptibility is not present in what is absolutely nonexistent. For, [Vyāsātīrtha] has said in the root text [i.e. the *Nyāyāmṛta* itself] that if perceptibility—defined as “being the object of a cognition”—is not present in what is nonexistent, then it follows that the cognition of the state of being different from what is nonexistent and so on are impossible[, yet you yourself refer to such things in your arguments in favour of indeterminacy]. And [Vyāsātīrtha] will demonstrate later on [in the *Nyāyāmṛta*] that no other sort of “perceptibility” can be the reason [in the first of Ānandabodha’s inferences].<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the flaw of partial-*siddhasādhana* cannot be refuted.

### Comments

In the corresponding passage of the *Advaitasiddhi*, Madhusūdana claimed, by analogy to the inference pressed against the Naiyāyikas to prove that tropes are both different and non-different from their substrates, that Ānandabodha’s inferences must seek to prove that the world has the absence of existence coupled with the absence of nonexistence. For, assuming that Ānandabodha’s inference was formulated as follows:

“The world is not existent, since [it is] perceptible” (*jagad asat, dṛśyatvāt*),

then the probandum would be present somewhere where the reason is absent. For, the probandum (the absence of existence) is present in nonexistent things like the hare’s horn, which, according to the Advaitins, is *not* perceptible and thus lacks the reason. Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka here simply points out that the assumption which this argument rests on is moot. In making this argument, Madhusūdana is of course assuming that nonexistent things are not perceptible, but Mādhva philosophers have long since argued that such things can indeed become the object of cognitive states.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 1)

nanu “prthivī itarabhinnā” ity atra jalādītrayodaśānyonyābhāvānām aikādhikarāṇyenāprasiddhāv api tejaḥprabhṛtiṣu <sup>[1]</sup>pratyekaṃ <sup>[1]</sup>prasiddhyāprasiddhiparihāravat, atrāpi sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantābhāvayor aikādhikarāṇyenāprasiddhāv api saty asattvātyantābhāvāsyāsati ca sattvātyantābhāvāsyā ca pretyekaṃ

<sup>33</sup> Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka is apparently referring here to the chapter of the first book of the *Nyāyāmṛta* where Vyāsātīrtha critiques the concept of perceptibility (NAB, 1:126–131).

prasiddhyāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvābhāvād iti cet; satyam. aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvābhāve 'py asattvātyantābhāvarūpāṃśasya siddhatvena siddhasāadhanatā syād ity āha pṛthivī ādinā. (NAB: 64.)<sup>34</sup>

1. pratyekaṃ pratyekaṃ NAMu

**Translation**

*Objection:* In the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”, even though the thirteen mutual absences from water and so on are not established to share a single location [before the inference takes place], the non-establishment [of the probandum] is averted because the [thirteen mutual absences from water and so on] are established individually in fire, etc. [before the inference takes place]. Likewise, even though the constant absence of existence and the constant absence of nonexistence are not established as being present in a single location [before Ānandabodha's inferences are made], since the constant absence of nonexistence is established in what is existent, and the constant absence of existence is established in what is nonexistent, [indeterminacy itself could be said to be well-established, and the subject in Ānandabodha's inferences] would not have an unestablished qualifier.

*Reply:* True enough. However, even if it is the case that [the subject in Ānandabodha's inferences] does not have an unestablished qualifier, nevertheless, since the part [of the probandum] comprising the constant absence of nonexistence is already established [in the subject prior to the inference, Ānandabodha's inferences] would prove something that is already established [to us Mādhvas]. With this in mind [Vyāsātīrtha] says: “Earth ...” (*pṛthivī*), and so on.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 2)**

abhāvam anantarbhāvya trayodaśatvaṃ bodhyam.

pratyekaṃ iti. saty asati cety arthaḥ. aikādhikaraṇyāvacchedena sādhyasiddher uddeśyatvenātraikādhikaraṇyāvacchedena sādhyaprasiddher abhāvād aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā syād evety āśayena kathaṃ cid ity uktam.

nanu kevalasyāsattvātyantābhāvasya siddhatve 'py asiddhena sattvātyantābhāvena sahocyamānatvād asiddhatvam eveti nāṃśe siddhasāadhanatety āha—na

<sup>34</sup> NAMu: 24v; NAPB: 45–46.

hīti. tathāh̥tve “parvataḥ vahnimān pāṣāṇavāṃś ca” ity atrāpi siddhasādhanaṭā nodbhāvyeteti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 64.)<sup>35</sup>

### Translation

It should be understood that there are thirteen [substances and categories] not including [the category of] absence.

“Separately ...” (*pratyekam*). What [Vyāsatīrtha] means is that [the constant absences of nonexistence and existence] are established in what exists and what does not exist[, respectively]. Since the objective [of Ānandabodha’s inferences] is to establish the probandum as determined by the property of “sharing a common locus”, and since [in Ānandabodha’s inferences] the probandum is not established insofar as it is determined by the property of sharing a common locus [before the inference takes place], it might still be the case that [the subject in the inference] has an unestablished qualifier. With this in mind [Vyāsatīrtha] says: “Somehow ...” (*katham cit*).

*Objection*: The constant absence of nonexistence, uncompounded [with any further property], is established [to the Mādhva as being present in the world before the inferences are formulated]. Nevertheless, since [we Advaitins] are speaking of [the constant absence of nonexistence] alongside the constant absence of existence, which is unestablished, [the constant absence of nonexistence] is itself unestablished, and hence the inferences do not prove in part something that is already established. In response to this [objection, Vyāsatīrtha] says: “For it is not ...” (*na hi*). If it were the case [that something that is established becomes unestablished simply by virtue of being asserted alongside something that is unestablished], then the flaw of proving something that is already established could not be applied to the case of the [fallacious] inference “The mountain possesses both fire and stone ...”[, where that inference is made for the benefit of someone who already knows that the mountain has stone on it]. This is the idea [behind Vyāsatīrtha’s argument].

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 3)

nanv evaṃ “pṛthivī itarabhinnā” ity atrāpi jalāditrayodaśānyonyābhāvānāṃ sādhyatvāt, jalādyekaikānyonyābhāvānāṃ api ghaṭo na jalādir iti pratītyā ghaṭatvāvacchedena siddhatvāt, aṃśe siddhasādhanaṭāpattir ity anumānaṃ duṣṭaṃ syād ity ata āha—pṛthivīti.

35 NAMu: 24v; NAB: 46.

jalādyekaikānyonyābhāvasya ghaṭe ghaṭatvāvacchedena siddhāv api pakṣa-  
tāvacchedakībhūtapṛthivītvāvacchedena ghaṭe na siddhiḥ, ato nāmśe siddhasā-  
dhanatety arthaḥ. pakṣatāvacchedakasāmānādhikaraṇyenaiva sādhyasiddher ud-  
deśyatvāt, tasyās cājātatvād iti bhāvaḥ.

pṛthivītvopahite. ghaṭa iti śeṣaḥ. prakṛte ca pakṣatāvacchedakasāmānādhika-  
raṇyenanaivāsadvailakṣaṇyasya siddhatvāt siddhasādhanateti draṣṭavyam. (NAB:  
64–65.)<sup>36</sup>

### Translation

*Objection:* If [the above argument to prove that *siddhasādhana* applies to Ānanda-  
bodha's inferences were valid], then [the valid inference] "Earth is different from  
the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]" would [also]  
be flawed. For, [in this inference] the probandum consists of the thirteen mutual ab-  
sences from water and [the remaining substances and categories apart from earth.  
And], since each individual absence from water and so on is established to be de-  
termined by potness by the judgment "Pot is not water, etc.", it would follow that  
[this] inference [too] is flawed because it proves in one part [of the subject, i.e. the  
pot,] something that is already established. Thus does Vyāsātīrtha say: "Earth ..." (*pṛthivī*).

Even though the individual mutual absences from water and so on are estab-  
lished in a pot as determined by *potness* [before the formulation of the inference,]  
they are not established in a pot as determined by *earthness*, which is the prop-  
erty that determines subjecthood [in the earth-inference], and therefore the flaw  
of proving in part something that is already established does not apply [to the  
earth-inference]. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means. For, the objective [of the earth-  
inference] is to establish the probandum insofar as it shares a common location  
with the determiner of subjecthood [i.e. earthness], and that has not come about  
[before the inference is made]. This is the idea [behind what Vyāsātīrtha says].

"In something that possesses earthness ..." (*pṛthivītvopahite*). "In a pot" needs  
to be supplied. Observe that in the present case [of Ānandabodha's inferences], by  
contrast, since the state of being different from what is nonexistent is already estab-  
lished to share a common locus with the determiner of subjecthood [because the  
Mādhva already accepts that the world lacks nonexistence], the flaw of *siddhasā-  
dhana* applies.

36 NAMu: 24v–25r; NAPB: 46.

## 9.6 TEXT 6: The flaw of the “example’s lacking the probandum”.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

dr̥ṣṭāntasya sādhyavaikalyāc ca. pṛthivīvahetus tu kevalavyatirekī. trayodaśānyo-  
nyābhāvarūpasādhyasya vyatirekanirūpaṇaṁ tu bhinnāśritānāṁ api trayodaśā-  
nyonyābhāvānāṁ samūhālabhanaikajñānopārūḍhatvamātreṇa yuktam. (NAḅ:  
53.)<sup>37</sup>

### Translation

Moreover, [M<sup>2</sup> is not tenable] because[, if it is adopted as the definition of “illusori-  
ness”,] then the example [in Ānandabodha’s inferences (the “silver”)] would lack the  
probandum[, since I do not accept that the silver has the constant absence of nonex-  
istence]. The reason [in the earth-inference]—earthness—on the other hand, is a  
universal-negative reason [and so, unlike Ānandabodha’s inferences, that inference  
does not require an example. It might be objected that in the absence of an exam-  
ple, the probandum in the earth-inference could not be established before the infer-  
ence takes place.] However [in the earth-inference] the cognition of the absence of  
the probandum, which [probandum] consists in the thirteen mutual absences [from  
the remaining substances and categories apart from earth], is only possible since,  
even though the thirteen mutual absences each occupy different locations, they are  
grasped in a single collective cognition [before the inference is made].

### Comments

For Madhusūdana’s answer to the charge that the example lacks the probandum  
(*sādhyavaikalya*), see the translation of the *Advaitasiddhi* above, TEXT 3.

Vyāsatīrtha now argues that if the Advaitins adopt M<sup>2</sup> as the probandum in  
Ānandabodha’s inferences, then those inferences must suffer from the flaw known  
as “[the example’s] lacking-the-probandum” ([*dr̥ṣṭāntasya*] *sādhyavaikalyam*). The  
example in an inference should be a familiar, non-controversial case that possesses  
both the probandum and the reason. Unlike the Advaitins, the Mādhvas accept that  
the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl is completely nonexistent, like the  
hare’s horn. Hence, while the Mādhvas accept that the fake silver has the constant  
absence of existence, they do not accept that it further has the constant absence of  
nonexistence. From their perspective, the example therefore lacks the probandum  
understood as these two separate properties.

<sup>37</sup> NAMu: 25r–25v; NAK: 110.

Vyāsātīrtha anticipates an objection to this argument. If we accept that the fact that one component of the probandum is missing from an “example” means that the inference is invalidated, then would not the Naiyāyikas’ inference to define earth also suffer from this flaw? Rāmācārya explains this objection as follows. Like Ānandabodha’s inferences to establish that the world is “indeterminate”, the earth-inference seemingly involves a “partite” probandum. In the case of the Advaitin’s inferences, the probandum consists of two separate absences: the constant absence of existence, and the constant absence of nonexistence. In the case of the earth-inference, the probandum consists of the thirteen mutual absences/differences from the substances and categories apart from earth.

The problem is that in the earth-inference there is no single individual that can serve as the example insofar as it possesses all thirteen mutual absences. While each of the substances/categories apart from earth contain *twelve* of the mutual absences that make up the probandum, they must all lack one of the thirteen mutual absences, because they cannot be different from *themselves*. Fire, for instance, may be different from water and the remaining substances and categories, but it cannot be different from itself. Vyāsātīrtha has claimed that if an example in an inference lacks a single one of the qualities that make up the probandum, then the flaw of “lacking the probandum” applies. So if none of the substances/categories apart from earth can have all of the qualities that together comprise the probandum, then does not this inference suffer from *sādhyaivaikalya* too? Vyāsātīrtha therefore reminds his Advaitin opponent that the reason in the earth-inference is a universal-negative (*kevalavyatirekin*) one. As such, the inference does not depend on an example in the same way that inferences that depend on a positive pervasion relationship between the probandum and the reason do. In a universal-negative inference, there can be no example, since the probandum only exists within the subject.

Vyāsātīrtha’s answer begs a further question, however. If there is no example, then how can the probandum in the earth-inference be known before the inference is formulated? The probandum in an inference must be somehow established before the inference takes place, but to claim that there is no positive example is, in effect, to claim that we know of no other single instance where the probandum is present prior to the inference. In response, Vyāsātīrtha says that we can have a cognition of the probandum in the earth-inference since we apprehend each absence in a different location before the inference brings them together in a single, collective cognition. Hence the probandum can be established prior to the inference, even though its components have not already been judged to be present in one single location.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 1)**

dr̥ṣṭāntasyeti. asattvābhāvasya sādhyatāvaccchedakāvacchinnasya śūktirūpyādāv abhāvād ity arthaḥ.

nanu bādhyatvarūpāsattvavyatirekasya tatrābhāve 'pi kva cid apy upādhausattvena pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvarūpāsattvavyatireko rūpyādāv apy asty eva, tasya tattvena pratīyamānatvāt.

maivam. sattvena pratīyamānatvarūpasyāsattvavyatirekasya sādhanam vyartham ity uktatvena bādhyatvarūpāsattvavyatirekasyaiva sādhayitum uctatvena sādhyavaikalypārihārāt. (NAv: 58.)<sup>38</sup>

**Translation**

“Of the example ...” (*dr̥ṣṭāntasya*). For, the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl and [other objects that appear in perceptual illusions] lack the absence of nonexistence, which [absence of nonexistence] is qualified by a determiner of probandumhood. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means.

*Objection* (Madhusūdana): Even though the absence of “nonexistence” in the form of “sublatability” might be absent from [the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl], nevertheless the absence of “nonexistence” in the form of “not being the locus of the property of being cognised as though existent in some substrate or other” is present even in the “silver” and [other objects of perceptual illusions]. For, [the “silver”] is cognised as though it were existent. [Hence the example cannot be said to lack the probandum, since it *does* have the absence of “nonexistence”].

*Reply*: This is untenable! For, [earlier in this text,<sup>39</sup> I] have stated that proving [that the “silver” has] the absence of nonexistence, insofar as that absence takes the form of “being cognised as existent [in some substrate or other]”, is pointless[, since it is already well-established that the “silver” is mistakenly cognised as existing in some substrate]. Hence it follows that it is proper [for you] only to prove the absence of “nonexistence” in the form of “sublatability”, and so [you] have failed to refute the charge that [the example] lacks the probandum.

**Comments**

In the *Advaitasiddhi*, Madhusūdana has argued that the charge of *sādhyavaikalya* does not apply to Ānandabodha’s inferences on the ground that his own definition of “nonexistence” makes this charge inapplicable. If “existence” means “non-

<sup>38</sup> NAK: 110; NATMu: 12r–12v.

<sup>39</sup> See above, *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, TEXT 3, for a translation of the passage Rāmācārya refers to here.

sublatability”, and “nonexistence” is taken to be the opposite of this (i.e. “sublatability”), then it is clearly impossible to claim that the silver in question has the “absence of nonexistence”. The claim in that case would be that the silver “lacks sublatability”, but it is clear that the silver does stand to be sublated by subsequent veridical judgments about the mother-of-pearl.

However, Madhusūdana’s attempt to define nonexistence seems to render the charge inapplicable. According to Madhusūdana’s definition, to say that something is nonexistent simply means to say that that thing is “not cognised as existing in some substrate”. The *absence* of nonexistence defined as such amounts to the quality of “being cognised as existing in some substrate”. The Mādhva must surely agree with the Advaitin that the “silver” is cognised as existing in some substrate, and so they must surely agree that the “silver” has the absence of “nonexistence” as Madhusūdana has defined it.

Rāmācārya here dismisses Madhusūdana’s argument on the basis of the arguments he has already made against Madhusūdana’s attempts to define nonexistence earlier in the *Taraṅginī* (see above, TEXT 3). Advaitin philosophers try to prove through circumstantial implication (*arthāpatti*) that the “silver” lacks nonexistence. However, if “nonexistence” consists in something’s “not being an object of cognition as existing in some substrate”, then their efforts are pointless. For, it is already established through experience that the “silver” in question is mistakenly cognised as existing where there is really mother-of-pearl. What Madhusūdana should really try to prove, says Rāmācārya, is that the “silver” has the absence of nonexistence defined as “sublatability”, but clearly the silver does have the property of sublatability.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 2)

nanv abhāvadvayasya sādhyatāyām rūpye sattvābhāvasya sattve ’pi asattvābhāvābhāvena yadi sādhyavaikalyam, tarhi “pṛthivī itarabhinnā” ity atra jale tejaḥprabhṛtidvādaśabhedānām sattve ’pi jalabhedasyābhāvena sādhyavaikalyam. evaṃ tejaḥprabhṛtiṣv api svasvetarapratiyogikadvādaśabhedasattve ’pi svasvabhedābhāvat sādhyavaikalyam eva syād ity āśaṅkyāha—pṛthivītvahetus tu kevalavyatirekīti. tathā ca na tatra dṛṣṭāntāpekṣeti na tatprayuktasādhyavaikalyādidoṣāvakāśa iti bhāvaḥ.

nanu pṛthivītvahetau dṛṣṭāntānapekṣaṇe sādhyaprasiddhyabhāvena sādhyavyatirekanirūpaṇam na syād ity ata āha—trayodaśeti. sādhyatāvaccchedakāvaccchin-

nānām trayodaśānyonyābhāvānām svasvādhikaraṇe vidyamānānām jñāne sati sādhyavyatirekanirūpaṇam syād ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 58.)<sup>40</sup>

### Translation

*Objection:* Let us assume that[, as Vyāsatīrtha has claimed, the example in Ānandabodha’s inferences] lacks the probandum on the ground that—the probandum consisting in the pair of absences [of existence and nonexistence]—the silver, though it possesses the absence of existence, lacks the absence of nonexistence. In that case, it follows that [the example also] lacks the probandum in the case of the [valid] inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”. For, even though twelve of the differences [that make up the probandum]—the differences from fire and [the eleven remaining substances and categories apart from earth]—are present in water[, for instance,] water cannot be different from water[, that is, from itself]. Likewise, even though fire [and the remaining substances and categories] possess twelve differences that have for their counterpositives [the twelve substances and categories] that are other than themselves, they cannot each be different *from themselves*. Hence [the example in the (valid) earth-inference] would lack the probandum, just as [you claim the example in Ānandabodha’s inferences does].

With this doubt in mind [Vyāsatīrtha] says: “By contrast, the reason—earthness—is a universal-negative one ...” (*pṛthivītvahetus tu kevalavyatirekī*). The idea [behind Vyāsatīrtha’s words] is that[, since it has a universal-negative reason, the earth-inference] does not depend on an example, and hence there is no scope for the application of the flaw of [the example’s] “lacking the probandum” and [the example’s “lacking the reason”], which only apply [if the inference has an example to lack those properties in the first place].

*Objection:* If the reason [in the earth-inference]—earthness—does not depend on an example, then the probandum must be unestablished, and thus the absence of the probandum could not be cognised [before the inference takes place]. With this in mind, [Vyāsatīrtha] says: “Thirteen ...” (*trayodaśa*). Provided that [one has] a cognition of the thirteen mutual absences, each qualified by a determiner of probandumhood, and each existing in their own locus, [one] can cognise the absence of the probandum.

40 NAK: 110–111; NATMu: 12v.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 3)**

nanv evam ekaikānyonyābhāvādhikaraṇasyāpi sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasādhyaadhikaraṇatayā tadvyāvṛttasya hetor asādhāraṇyaṃ syād ity āśaṅkāparihārāyoktam—samūhālambanaikajñānopārūḍhatvamātreṇeti. ekaikānyonyābhāvasya na sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnatvam, sādhyatāvacchedakasya samūhālambanaikajñānopārūḍhatvasya vyāsajyavṛtter dharmasya pratyekābhāveṣv aparyāpteḥ. tathā ca pratyekābhāvādhikaraṇasya na sapakṣatvam, sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasādhyaarahitavāt.

tad uktam, tāvadabhāvayogī hy atra sapakṣo bhavati, na tu tadekadeśakatipayābhāvavān, sādhyatāyās tāvaty<sup>[1]</sup> aparyāpter<sup>[1]</sup> iti. sattvātyantābhāvādes tu pratyekam sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnatve ’pi nāsādhāraṇyam, dṛṣṭāntasya sattvād iti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 58.)<sup>41</sup>

1. NAB, NAK, and NAT<sub>Mu</sub> all read *paryāpter* here. I have emended this to read with the editions of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, which is the text that Rāmācārya is quoting here.

**Translation**

*Objection:* In that case, the locus of each of the individual mutual absences [that comprise the probandum in the earth-inference] must be a locus of the probandum qualified by a determiner of probandumhood. Hence the reason[—earthness—], which is absent from [each of those individuals], would be an “uncommon” pseudo-reason[, because it is absent from something that is known to possess the probandum qualified by a determiner of probandumhood]. In order to assuage this doubt, [Vyāsātirtha] says: “Only by virtue of being grasped in a single collective cognition ...” (*samūhālambanaikajñānopārūḍhatvamātreṇa*). Each individual mutual absence is not qualified by a determiner of probandumhood. For, the determiner of probandumhood—the quality of “being grasped in a single collective cognition”—is a “collectively present” (*vyāsajyavṛtti*) property, and is therefore not completely present (*aparyāpti*) in each [of the locations that contain the thirteen mutual absences] taken individually. And so, the locus of each [mutual] absence is not a homologue (*sapakṣa*), since it lacks the probandum as qualified by the determiner of probandumhood.

As it is said [by Gaṅgeśa in the *Kevalavyatirekivāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*]: “[The reason in the earth inference is not “uncommon”]. For, only that which has these absences in their entirety qualifies as a homologue in this instance, and not

41 NAK: 111; NAT<sub>Mu</sub>: 12v–13r.

something that possesses *some* of the absences in *a certain* part, because probandumhood is not completely present (*aparyāpteḥ*) in just that much.”<sup>42</sup> Even though the constant absences of existence and [nonexistence] are, by contrast [to the absences that make up the probandum in the earth-inference], individually qualified by a determiner of probandumhood, the [reasons in Ānandabodha’s inferences are not] pseudo-reasons of the “uncommon” variety, because[, unlike the earth-inference,] there is an example [in these inferences, i.e. the “silver”]. This is the idea [behind what Vyāsātīrtha says here].

### Comments

Rāmācārya here considers the objection that the reason in the earth-inference could be said to be defective given the stance Vyāsātīrtha takes on it in this part of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. An “uncommon” pseudo-reason is one that fails to occur in some location that is known to possess the probandum. Let us imagine that each of the thirteen mutual absences that make up the probandum in that inference are each established in a separate location—the absence of fire is established in water, the absence of water in fire, and so on. In this case, each of the things that make up the probandum could be considered a homologue (*sapakṣa*), that is, a location where the probandum is known to be present. For, each could be said to possess “a probandum as qualified by a determiner of probandumhood” by possessing just one of the thirteen mutual absences in question. What Rāmācārya seems to have in mind here is that the abstract properties belonging to the individual absences—“the state of being the mutual absence of water” (*jalānyonyābhāvatva*), and so on—all determine probandumhood individually.

In response, Rāmācārya says that by the expression “only by virtue of being grasped in a single, collective cognition” (*samūhālambanaikajñānopārūḍhātvaṃātreṇa*), Vyāsātīrtha is indicating the property that determines probandumhood in the earth-inference. The thirteen separate mutual absences make up the probandum only insofar as they are grasped together in such a cognition. More technically: probandumhood is determined not by the thirteen separate qualities belonging to the individual absences, but by a single, collectively present (*vyāsajyavṛtti*) quality that is only completely present in all thirteen absences taken collectively. Hence, while each component of the probandum is known to be present in some location other than earth before the inference takes place, the locus of each individual absence cannot qualify as a homologue, since it lacks the probandum as *qualified by the determiner of probandumhood*. As a severally present quality, the

<sup>42</sup> This is a quote from the *Kevalavyatirekivāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (ACN, 1:622). See Phillips (2020: 795–796) for a translation and explanation of this passage.

state of “being the object of a collective cognition” cannot be completely present in any of those absences; hence they cannot be said to be individually “qualified by the determiner of probandumhood”. To support this position, Rāmācārya cites the *Kevalavyatirekivāda* of Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, where Gaṅgeśa seems to endorse this line of reasoning.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 1)

dr̥ṣṭāntasyeti. dharmadvayasya sādhyatvān manmate śukṭirūpye sattvātyantābhāvasya sattve ’py asattvasyaiva sattvena tadatyantābhāvasya tatrābhāvāt sādhyavaikalyam ity arthaḥ.

nanv evaṃ tarhi “pr̥thivī itarabhinna” ity atrāpi trayodaśabhedānām sādhyatvāj jalādaḥ tejaḥprabhṛtidvādaśabhedānām sattve ’pi jalabhedasyābhāvāt sādhyavaikalyam. evaṃ tejaḥprabhṛtiṣv api svasveterapratiyogikadvādaśabhedasattve ’pi svasvabhedābhāvāt sādhyavaikalyam eva syād ity ata āha—pr̥thivītveti. yatretarātvam, tatra pr̥thivītvābhāva iti vyatireke jalādir dr̥ṣṭānta iti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 65.)<sup>43</sup>

### Translation

“Of the example ...” (*dr̥ṣṭāntasya*). For, the probandum [defined as M<sup>2</sup>] consists in a pair of qualities [i.e. the constant absences of existence and nonexistence]; and, in my view, the silver superimposed on mother-of-pearl lacks the constant absence of nonexistence, since it possesses nonexistence despite lacking existence. Hence [the example in Ānandabodha’s inferences] lacks the probandum. This is what [Vyāsatīrtha] means.

*Objection:* In that case, [the example] in the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]” would [also] lack the probandum. For, [in that inference] the probandum consists of thirteen mutual absences/[differences]. Hence, even though the twelve differences from fire and so on are present in water and so on, the difference from water [itself] would not be present there. Likewise, even though the twelve differences that have as their counterpositive each and every thing different from [water and so on] themselves would be present in fire and so on, the difference [of each substance/category] from itself could not be present there. With this [objection] in mind [Vyāsatīrtha] says: “Earthness ...” (*pr̥thivīva*). The idea behind [Vyāsatīrtha’s words here is that] water and so on serve as the example for the negative-pervasion “Where there is the property of being other than [earth], there is the absence of earthness”.

43 NAMu: 25r; NAPB: 46–47.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 2)**

nanu pṛthivītvahetau vyatirekiṇi dṛṣṭāntābhāve trayodaśānyonyābhāvānām sādhyabhūtānām prasiddhyabhāvena sādhyavyatirekanirūpaṇam na syād ity ata āha—trayodaśeti. jalāditrayodaśānyonyābhāvānām tejaḥprabhṛtiṣu pratyekaṁ pratyekaṁ jñānānantaram ete trayodaśānyonyābhāvā iti samūhāmbanarūpajñānopārūḍhānām prasiddhisambhavana vyatirekanirūpaṇam sambhavatīti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 65.)<sup>44</sup>

**Translation**

*Objection:* Since there is no example in the case of the universal-negative reason “earthness”, it follows that the thirteen mutual absences that comprise the probandum cannot be established [before the inference takes place]; hence there cannot be the cognition of the absence of the probandum. With this in mind [Vyāsātīrtha] says: “Thirteen ...” (*trayodaśa*). The thirteen mutual absences of water [and the remaining substances and categories apart from earth] can be established insofar as they are grasped in a single, collective cognition (“These are the thirteen mutual absences”), which occurs after they are each cognised individually in fire [and the remaining substances and categories apart from earth]. Hence there can be the cognition of the absence of the probandum. This is the idea [behind what Vyāsātīrtha says here].

**9.7 TEXT 7: Extension of the above flaws to the third definition.****Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)**

ata eva na tṛtīyaḥ; vyāhateḥ, arthāntarāt,<sup>[1]</sup> sādhyavaikalyāc<sup>[1]</sup> ca. (NAB: 53.)<sup>45</sup>

1. dṛṣṭānte sādhyavaikalyāc NAB (vL), NAMu (vL)

**Translation**

For these very reasons is M<sup>3</sup> not tenable—because of contradiction, because [it would] fail to prove what [you, the Advaitins,] intend to prove, and because [your putative example] lacks the probandum.

<sup>44</sup> NAMu: 25r–25v; NAPB: 47.

<sup>45</sup> NAK: 111; NAMu: 25r–25v.

### Comments

Vyāsatīrtha now begins his critique of  $M^3$ . He claims that three of the charges that were levelled against  $M^2$  apply equally to  $M^3$ .

Rāmācārya anticipates an objection to the claim that  $M^3$  suffers leads to a contradiction in the same way that  $M^2$  does. In  $M^2$ , the probandum is taken to be a pair of distinct qualities—the constant absence of existence, and the constant absence of nonexistence. In  $M^3$ , by contrast, these qualities are compounded into a single “qualified”/compound thing—“the property of possessing the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the property of possessing the constant absence of existence”. Given this distinction, can the charge of contradiction really be applied in the same way to  $M^3$  as it was to  $M^2$ ? Rāmācārya argues that this is not a significant distinction from the point of view of the charge of contradiction. Two things can only be related as qualifier and qualified if they share a common locus; hence proving that  $M^3$  is present in some locus necessarily entails proving that the constant absences of existence and nonexistence are present there, and this must surely amount to a contradiction.

According to Vyāsatīrtha,  $M^3$  further leads to the flaw of *arthāntara*, because, like  $M^2$ , it fails to establish what the Advaitin really wants to establish. Like  $M^2$ ,  $M^3$  proves that the world has the “constant absence of existence”. However, as Vyāsatīrtha has argued (in TEXT 4), it is always possible that the world—like the Advaitin’s *brahman*—is existent by its very essence, even though it lacks the *property* of existence. In themselves, neither  $M^2$  nor  $M^3$  rule out this possibility. Moreover, in case  $M^3$  is adopted as the probandum, the Advaitins’ example—the “silver”—still lacks the probandum from the Mādhva’s point of view. “Illusoriness” still consists in part in the “constant absence of nonexistence”, and the Mādhvas, who accept that the “silver” is simply nonexistent, do not accept that the silver possesses such an absence.

So far, Vyāsatīrtha has claimed that the following flaws apply to  $M^1$ – $M^3$ :

- $M^1$ : Proving something that is already established (*siddhasādhana*).
- $M^2$ : Contradiction (*vyāhati*); failing to prove what one intends to prove (*arthāntara*); proving something that is already established (*siddhasādhana*); the example’s lacking the probandum (*dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavaikalya*).
- $M^3$ : Contradiction (*vyāhati*); failing to prove what one intends to prove (*arthāntara*); the example’s lacking the probandum (*dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavaikalya*).

In the remaining portion of the PMBh, Vyāsatīrtha will argue that while  $M^3$  does not lead to *siddhasādhana*, it still leads to the flaw of “[the subject’s] having-an-unestablished-qualifier” (*aprasiddhaviśeṣanātā*).

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*)**

nanv ata evety atidiṣṭā vyāhatir anupapannā. ekaṭra viruddhobhayapratiyogikā-  
tyantābhāvasādhane hi sā syāt; na cātrobhayātyantābhāvau sādhyāv ity ata āha—  
vyāhater iti. ubhayātyantābhāvayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyoktau vyāhativad ubhayā-  
tyantābhāvayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyena sambandhena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvovaktā  
api vyāhatir ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 58.)<sup>46</sup>

**Translation**

*Objection:* It is unreasonable [for Vyāsātīrtha] to further apply contradiction [to  $M^3$  as well as  $M^2$ , as he does when he says,] “For these very same reasons [is  $M^3$  not tenable] ...”. For, [contradiction] would ensue only if [we Advaitins] proved that the constant absences that have two contradictory [properties—existence and nonexistence—]for their counterpositives, are present in one and the same location. But, in the case at hand [( $M^3$ )] the constant absences of both [existence and nonexistence] are not both probanda.

*Reply:* To this objection [Vyāsātīrtha] responds: “Because of contradiction ...” (*vyāhateḥ*). Just as a contradiction ensues if [you] state that the constant absences of both [existence and nonexistence] share a common locus, if [you] assert that the constant absences of both [existence and nonexistence] are, as a result of their being connected as sharing a common locus, related as qualifier and qualified, there is still a contradiction. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means.

**9.8 TEXT 8: *Siddhasādhana* might not apply to the third definition.****Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)**

kiṃ ca yathā “anitye vāñmanasī”<sup>47</sup> ity atra <sup>[1]</sup>pakṣatāvachedakanānātvenāmṣe<sup>[1]</sup>  
siddhasādhanatve ‘pi, “pṛthivī itarabhinnā” ity atra pakṣatāvachedakaikyān <sup>[2]</sup>nā-  
mṣe<sup>[2]</sup> siddhasādhanam; tatthehāpi yady api katham cit sādhyatāvachedakaikyān  
nāmṣe siddhasādhanatvam ... (NAB: 53.)<sup>48</sup>

1. pakṣatāvachedakanānātvenāmṣataḥ NAMu (vL.)

<sup>46</sup> NAK: 111; NATMu: 13r.

<sup>47</sup> All the editions read *vāñmanase* here. I follow Phillips (2020: 789), who emends the same expression in the text of the *Anumānacintāmaṇi* on the advice of Ramanuja Tatacharya.

<sup>48</sup> NAMu: 25v; NAK: 112.

## 2. nāṃśataḥ NAMu (vI.)

**Translation**

Moreover, let it be that, somehow, in case [you adopt  $M^3$  as the probandum in Ānandabodha's inferences,] then [those inferences] do *not* prove, in part, something that is already established [to me, the Mādhva]. For, the inference “Speech and mind are noneternal[, because they are products]” does prove in part something that is already established [to the Naiyāyika who is supposed to benefit from it,] since more than one property determines subjecthood [in that inference]. By contrast, the inference “Earth is different [from the remaining substances and categories, because it has earthness]” does not prove in part something that is already established, since there is only one property that determines subjecthood [in that inference, i.e. earthness]. Likewise [in Ānandabodha's inferences, if  $M^3$  is adopted as the probandum,] then there is only one property [(“the quality of possessing the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the quality of possessing the constant absence of existence”)] that determines subjecthood[; hence the inference does not prove something that is already established]. ...

**Comments**

In TEXT 5, Vyāsātīrtha argued that  $M^2$  proves, in part, something that is already established to him as a realist, because he already accepts that the world has the “constant absence of nonexistence”. Vyāsātīrtha now tentatively concedes that if  $M^3$  is taken to be the probandum in Ānandabodha's inferences, then those inferences might not prove something that he already accepts. Both  $M^2$  and  $M^3$  ultimately amount to the claim that something lacks both existence and nonexistence. However,  $M^2$  treats them as two distinct properties, whereas  $M^3$  compounds them together, as a single “qualified” property. Thus, if  $M^3$  is adopted as the probandum, there is only one determiner of probandumhood. This has important implications for evaluating this definition of indeterminacy/illusoriness.

Vyāsātīrtha cites the inference “Speech and mind are noneternal, because they are products” as precedent in this matter. Gaṅgeśa, who uses this example in the *Kevalavyatirekivāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, argued that the flaw of partial *siddhasādhana* only applies in this inference because there is more than one property that determines subjecthood.<sup>49</sup> The subject in the inference is a partite one, consisting of two separate entities: speech and mind. Consequently, both speechness (*vāktva*) and mindness (*manastva*) determine subjecthood. According to Śrīnivāsatīrtha, the

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<sup>49</sup> See ACN: 613. See Phillips (2020: 789) for a translation and discussion of this passage.

flaw of *siddhasādhana* applies, since it is already established to the Naiyāyika that speech is noneternal. Vyāsātīrtha reasons on the basis of this example that the same does apply if multiple properties determine *probandumhood* in an inference, but does not if there is just one property determining probandumhood. Unlike  $M^2$ ,  $M^3$  consists in a single compound entity. Consequently, by analogy, it cannot be said to suffer from the flaw of partial *siddhasādhana*.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*)

kiṃ ceti. yady api nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam, nāpi vyarthaviśeṣyatvam; tathāpy aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam ity anvayaḥ.

pakṣatāvacchedakanānatveneti. yady api pakṣatāvacchedakanānātve 'py ukta-vidhayā nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam, tathāpi matāntareṇedaṃ bodhyam.

pakṣatāvacchedakaikyād iti. pakṣatāvacchedakaikye 'ṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam na bhavaty eva. tathā hi—pakṣatāvacchedakadharmasāmānādhikaraṇyena sādhyasiddhau hi siddhasāadhanam eva, nāṃśataḥ siddhasāadhanam; tādrśasiddher evānumānasādhyatvāt. tadasiddhau ca tacchaṅkaiva nāsti. na hi pakṣe sādhyasiddhimātreṇa tat, kiṃ tu pakṣatāvacchedakadharmasāmānādhikaraṇyena sādhyasiddhyā. anyathā dhūmavattvena parvate vahniniścaye 'pi siddhasādhana-prasaṅgād ity arthaḥ.

sādhyatāvacchedakaikyād iti. sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaśādhyasiddher abhāvād ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 58–59.)<sup>50</sup>

### Translation

“Moreover ...” (*kiṃ ca*). The connection [between this passage and TEXT 10 of the *Nyāyāmṛta*] is as follows: “Even though[, if  $M^3$  is adopted as the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences, those inferences] do not prove in part something that is already established, and [their probandum] does not have a purposeless qualificandum [...] nevertheless, [their subject] has an unestablished qualifier[/probandum]”.

“Since multiple properties determine subjecthood ...” (*pakṣatāvacchedakanānatvena*). Even though [when  $M^3$  is adopted as their probandum, Ānandabodha’s inferences] might not prove in part something that is already established in the way described [by Vyāsātīrtha earlier in this text],<sup>51</sup> nevertheless if [one] were of

<sup>50</sup> NAK: 112; NATMu: 13r.

<sup>51</sup> See the translation of the *Nyāyāmṛta* above, TEXT 5, for the argument that Rāmācārya is referring to here.

a different persuasion, [one] might conclude [that the inferences do in fact suffer from *siddhasādhana* in this way].

“Because there is only one property that determines subjecthood ...” (*pakṣatāvachedakaikyāt*). If there is only a single determiner of subjecthood [in an inference], then [that inference] cannot prove in part something that is already established. To explain: If it is already established that the probandum shares a common locus with the property that determines subjecthood [in such an inference], then [that inference] is simply proving something that is already established, and not proving *in part* something that is already established. For, it is precisely the fact that [the probandum shares a common locus with the property that determines subjecthood] that an inference seeks to establish. And if it is *not* [already] established [that the probandum shares a common locus with the property that determines subjecthood], then there cannot be the slightest doubt [that the inference suffers from *siddhasādhana*]. For, [an inference does not prove something that is already established] simply because [its] probandum is established to be present in the subject, but because the probandum is established to share a common locus with the property that determines subjecthood. Otherwise, it would follow that if [one] were already certain that fire was present on a mountain [merely] insofar as [the mountain] is *something that possesses smoke*, [an inference to prove that there is fire on the mountain *insofar as it is a mountain*] would be proving something that is already established[, yet this is wrong, for it would clearly tell us something new].

“Because there is only one determiner of probandumhood ...” (*sādhyaatāvachedakaikyāt*). Because it has not [yet] been established that the probandum qualified by the determiner of probandumhood [is present in the subject]. This is what [Vyāsatīrtha] means.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 1)

viśiṣṭasāadhanapakṣe 'mśe siddhasāadhanātideśaḥ kuto na kriyata iti śaṅkāyām a-  
smin pakṣe 'mśe siddhasāadhanasyānavakāśaṃ vadan, tathā vyārtha<sup>[1]</sup>viśeṣyatvarū-  
paṃ<sup>[1]</sup> doṣāntaram ca nāstīti vadan, aprasiddha<sup>[2]</sup>viśeṣaṇatvākhyam<sup>[2]</sup> doṣāntaram  
āha—kiṃ cety ādinā. kiṃ cāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam ity anvayaḥ.

pakṣatāvachedakanānātveneti. tathā ca vāktvāvachedenānityatvasya sid-  
dhatvād iti bhāvaḥ.

pakṣatāvachedakaikyād iti. pakṣatāvachedakaikye hi pakṣatāvachedakasā-  
mānādhikaraṇyena sādhyasya siddhatvāt sampūrṇasiddhasāadhanam eva, nām-  
śataḥ siddhasāadhanam. “pṛthivī itarabhinna” ity atra tu pṛthivīvarūpapakṣatāva-

cchedakasāmānādhikaranyena sādhyasiddhirūpoddeśyapratīter asiddhatvenāṁśe siddhasāadhanānavakāśād ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 65.)<sup>52</sup>

1. viśeṣyatvākhyam NAMu (vl.)
2. viśeṣaṇatvarūpam NAMu (vl.)

### Translation

“Why have you not extended the charge of proving in part something that is already established to the view that [Ānandabodha’s inferences] prove that a qualified entity [i.e. M<sup>3</sup> is present in the world]?” In [response] to this doubt[, Vyāsātīrtha] states that according to the view that [“indeterminacy” is a qualified entity,] there is no scope for the flaw of proving in part something that is already established. Likewise, he states that there is not another flaw, namely, having a purposeless qualificandum (*vyarthaviśeṣyatva*). [Nevertheless, Vyāsātīrtha] states that another flaw—[the subject’s] having an unestablished qualifier—applies [to the inferences in this case]: “Moreover ...” (*kiṃ ca*). “Moreover [...] there is the flaw of [the subject’s] having-an-unestablished-qualifier”: this is the connection [between this passage and the subsequent one].<sup>53</sup>

“Because more than one property determines subjecthood ...” (*pakṣatāvaccchedakanānātvena*). For, noneternality is established to be determined by [one of the properties that determines subjecthood, i.e.] speechness. This is the idea [behind Vyāsātīrtha’s words here].

“Because only one property determines subjecthood ...” (*pakṣatāvaccchedakai-kyāt*). For, when only one property determines subjecthood, if the probandum is established as sharing a common locus with the determiner of subjecthood, then the flaw of proving *in toto* something that is already established applies, and not proving *in part* something that is already established. In the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]” on the other hand, the flaw of proving in part something that is already established is not applicable. For, the cognition that [the inference] seeks to produce—the proof that the probandum shares a common locus with the determiner of subjecthood (i.e. earthness)—has not already taken place [in the beneficiary of the inference before the inference is formulated]. This is the idea [behind Vyāsātīrtha’s words here].

52 NAMu: 25v; NAPB: 47–48.

53 The passage of the *Nyāyāmṛta* that Śrīnivāsātīrtha is referring to here is translated below in TEXT 10.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 2)**

sādhya-tāvaccchedaketi. pakṣatāvaccchedakanānātva evāṃśe siddhasādhanavat sādhyatāvaccchedakanānātva evāṃśe siddhasādhanatā. ata eva dharmadvayasādhana-pakṣe 'ṃśe siddhasādhanatoktā. pakṣatāvaccchedakaiky 'ṃśe siddhasādhana-tvābhāvavat sādhyatāvaccchedakaiky 'pi nāṃśe siddhasādhanam. evaṃ ca prakṛte viśiṣṭasyaikasya sādhyatvena sādhyatāvaccchedakaikyena tadavacchinna-sādhya-syāsiddhatvān nāṃśe siddhasādhanāvakāśa ity arthaḥ.

viśiṣṭam viśeṣānādyātmakam iti pakṣe sādhyatāvaccchedakaikyam nāsty evety āśayena katham cid ity uktam. (NAB: 65.)<sup>54</sup>

**Translation**

“The property that determines probandumhood ...” (*sādhya-tāvaccchedaka*). The flaw of partial *siddhasādhana* applies only if more than one property determines subjecthood [in an inference]. In the same way, that flaw only applies if more than one property determines probandumhood [in an inference]. It is for this very reason that [Vyāsātīrtha] stated [earlier in this chapter] that the flaw of partial *siddhasādhana* applies to [Ānandabodha’s inferences if one takes] the stance that [those inferences] prove that [the world has] a pair of properties [i.e. the constant absence of existence, and the constant absence of nonexistence]. Just as the flaw of partial *siddhasādhana* does not apply [to an inference if only one property determines subjecthood], likewise does it fail to apply if only one property determines probandumhood. Hence, in the [inferences] at hand, since the probandum is a single qualified entity [i.e.  $M^3$ ], it follows that only one property determines probandumhood. Thus, since the probandum qualified by [the single determiner of probandumhood] has not been established [to be present in the subject], the flaw of *siddhasādhana* is inapplicable. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means.

“According to the view that a qualified entity consists of [nothing more than its parts, i.e.] the qualifier, [the qualificandum, and the relationship between the two, if  $M^3$  is taken as the probandum, then] there is not just one property that determines probandumhood[, since in that case probandumhood is determined by the three components of the qualified thing]”. It is with this [doubt] in mind that [Vyāsātīrtha] says: “Somehow ...” (*katham cid*).

54 NAMu: 25v–26r; NAPB: 48.

## 9.9 TEXT 9: The third definition does not have a purposeless qualificandum.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

... nāpi vyarthaviśeṣyatvam. “vimatam upādānāparokṣajñaptikīrṣākṛtimajjan-nyam ...” ity atra kṛtighraṇenaiveśvarasiddhāv api cikīrṣāder iva, “guṇādikam guṇyādinā bhinnābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt” ity atra tārīkāṅgīkṛtabhinnatva-syeva ca, vyāpakaviśeṣaṇānām uddeśyapratītyarthatvāt; iha <sup>[1]</sup>tu<sup>[1]</sup> sadvilakṣaṇatve saty asadvilakṣaṇam iti pratīter uddeśyatvāt.

yadi cābhede saty api ghaṭaḥ kalaśa iti sāmānādhikaraṇyādarśanād aprayojak-  
atvanirāsāya viśiṣṭadhīs tatroddeśyā, tarhi tucche sadvailakṣaṇye saty api dṛśya-  
tvādarśanād ihāpi soddeśyeti samam .... (NAB: 53.)<sup>55</sup>

1. ca NAMu

### Translation

... And, [if we adopt M<sup>3</sup> as the definition of “illusoriness”, then the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences] would *not* have a pointless qualificandum[, i.e. “the constant absence of nonexistence”]. For, qualifiers attached to the property that pervades [the reason] can have the purpose of [giving rise to] the judgment that [the inference] is intended to produce (*uddeśyapratīti*). This is so, for instance, in the case of [the qualifiers] “a desire to make” (*cikīrṣā*) and [“an immediate knowledge of the material cause” (*upādāna-aparokṣa-jñapti*)], in the [Naiyāyikas’] inference [to prove the existence of god],

“The object of [our] dispute [i.e. the world] is produced by one who has an immediate knowledge of [its] material causes, a desire to make, and effort [itself] ...”,

where the existence of god could be established simply by stating that [he possesses] effort. Likewise is this the case for the [qualifier] “being different” (*bhinnatva*) in the [probandum of the inference],

“Tropes and [other properties] are both different and non-different from the things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [tropes and other properties are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]”,

55 NAB: 25v–26v; NAK: 112–113.

which is [already] accepted by the Naiyāyikas [who accept that tropes, etc., and their substrates are simply different from one another]. For, in the present case [of Ānandabodha's inferences], the objective [of the inferences is to produce] a cognition of the form: "[The world is] different from what is nonexistent, while being different from what is existent".

On the other hand, it might be held that the [*bhedābheda*-inference] seeks to generate a cognition of a qualified entity in order to ensure that its [reason] determines [its probandum]. For, we do *not* observe that grammatical apposition is employed when [two things] are [simply] non-different from each other, as in the expression, "Pot (*ghaṭa*) is pot (*kalaśa*)", for instance. In that case, it could also be said of [Ānandabodha's inferences] that they seek to generate a cognition [of a qualified entity] for the same reason. For, even though the state of being different from what is existent is present in what is absolutely nonexistent, we observe that [the reason]—perceptibility—is not present there [so far as the Advaitin is concerned].

### Comments

In the preceding text, Vyāsatīrtha has conceded that if we adopt M<sup>3</sup> as the probandum in Ānandabodha's inferences, then those inferences cannot be charged with proving something that is already established. Still, the probandum might be subject to a further flaw. In M<sup>3</sup>, the constant absence of existence is the qualifier, and the constant absence of nonexistence is the qualificandum. Since the Mādhva accepts that the constant absence of nonexistence is present in the world, it could be argued that the qualificandum serves no purpose. However, Vyāsatīrtha argues that this flaw does not apply here. He finds precedent in two inferences. The first is the inference of the Naiyāyikas to prove that all effects in the world around us are created by a god (*īśvara*). More specifically, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argued that inference can establish that the various effects in the world are created by a being who has three qualities: (1) a direct knowledge of the stuff out of which the world is to be formed (*upādāna-āparokṣa-jñapti*); (2) a desire to create (*cikīrṣā*) the world; and (3) the creative effort (*kṛti*) itself.

Vyāsatīrtha assumes that the Naiyāyika could prove that there is a god if the probandum in the inference were simply *kṛtimajjanyam*: "produced by one who possesses effort". It would suffice for someone seeking to prove the existence of a creator to say that the effects in the world are produced by a being who possesses creative effort, without further mention of that being's awareness of the material cause out of which the world is to be fashioned or desire to create. Nevertheless, these extra qualifiers might still serve a purpose in the inference. The person who employs the inference does so in order to produce a particular judgment (the "target-cognition" [*uddeśyapratīti*]) on the part of the person to whom the inference is di-

rected. Vyāsātīrtha concedes that since the qualifiers are enlisted specifically for the purpose of giving rise to this cognition, they might not be regarded as pointless.

Vyāsātīrtha argues that this reasoning might also apply to another well-known inference. This is the inference that attempts to establish that properties such as tropes (*guṇa*), motions (*karman*), and universals (*jāti*) are both different and non-different from the substrates in which they inhere. This inference has already been discussed above (*Advaitasiddhi*, TEXT 5), since Madhusūdana himself adopted much of Vyāsātīrtha's reasoning in his defence of Ānandabodha's inferences. Again, the inference would be directed against a Naiyāyika by members of one of the many schools (including the Mādhvas) who accept that properties are both different and non-different from their substrates. Since the Naiyāyika already accepts that these properties are different from their substrates, it might be argued that the qualifier in the inference ("being different") is pointless. However, it might also be argued in this case that the extra qualifier has the purpose of giving rise to the specific judgment that the person making the inference against the Naiyāyika wishes to produce in them. It is the product of a definite intention to produce a particular cognitive result.

However, Vyāsātīrtha realises that there might be a different reason for adding the non-controversial part to the probandum in the *bhedābheda* inference. Let us assume that we abandoned the part of the probandum that the Naiyāyika already accepts ("differentiatedness", *bhinnatva*). In that case the inference would read as follows:

"Tropes and [other properties] are *non-different* from the things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [tropes and other properties are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]" (*guṇādikaṃ guṇyādinābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt*).

This inference is faulty, because the probandum no longer pervades the reason. Words that refer to identical things are not placed in grammatical apposition with one another; again, we do not say, "Pot (*ghaṭa*) is pot (*kalaśa*)", for instance. Hence the reason ("being placed in grammatical apposition") would be absent from something that possesses the probandum.

So Vyāsātīrtha says that it is necessary to qualify non-difference with difference in the probandum in order that the quality of "being placed in grammatical apposition" should be a "determiner" (*prayojaka*) of the probandum. Rāmācārya and Śrīnīvāsātīrtha both explain that the term *prayojaka* is used in a special sense here. The word usually entails that the reason can only be present if accompanied by the probandum. If this is not the case, then the reason is said to be "inconclusive" (*aprayojaka*) in the sense that it cannot definitively prove that the inferential subject has the probandum. However, according to these commentators, Vyāsātīrtha is using the term to mean that the reason is absent even though the probandum

is present. In other words, the reason as it stands (“being placed in grammatical apposition”) is absent from something that possesses the probandum (“being non-different”), that is, the case of synonymous words.<sup>56</sup> So adding the non-controversial quality of “differentiatedness” to the inference seems to have a purpose beyond merely that of giving rise to the particular cognition that the person making the inference has in mind.

In this case, how can the *bhedābheda*-inference serve as precedent for Vyāsatīrtha’s judgment that Ānandabodha’s inferences need not suffer from *vyarthav-iṣeṣyatva* if we adopt M<sup>3</sup> as their probandum? Vyāsatīrtha responds to this concern by noting that the same reason might hold for adding the non-controversial “possessing the constant absence of nonexistence” (*asattvātyantābhāvavattvam*) quality to the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences. Things that are non-existent (the hare’s horns and the like) lack perceptibility, at least according to the Advaitins. Consequently, it is necessary for the Advaitins to add the non-controversial component—“the constant absence of nonexistence”—to the controversial component—“the constant absence of existence”—in order to ensure that cognisability should function as a valid reason for proving that the world is illusory.

56 Śrīnivāsatīrtha explains as follows: *nanu bhedābhedānumānadṛṣṭānto na yuktaḥ. tatra* <sup>[1]</sup>*guṇādikam* <sup>[1]</sup>*guṇyādīnābhinnam ity eva kṛte 'bhedarūpasādhyavati ghaṭakalaśādaḥ ghaṭaḥ kalaśa ity prayogādarśanena samānādhikṛtatvarūpahetvabhāvenābhedarūpasādhyam prati samānādhikṛtatvasya prayojakatvābhāvāt. hetur astu sādhyam māstv ity evaṃrūpāprayojakatātra nābhipretā. kiṃ nāma tasmin saty abhavataḥ, tena vināpi bhavataḥ, tada* <sup>[2]</sup>*prayojakatvād* <sup>[2]</sup>*iti vacanāt sādhye saty apy abhavato hetoḥ sādhye prayojakatvābhāvāt. ato 'prayojakatānirāsāya bhedaviśiṣṭadhis tatroddeśyā. (Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa, NAB, 1:66.)* Emendations: (1) I have emended this from the NAB reading, which adds the compound *guṇyādikam* after *guṇādikam*. (2) I have emended this to reflect the reading of this quotation found in the *Taraṅginī*. “Objection: The example of the inference [to persuade the Naiyāyika that tropes and so on are] both different and non-different [from their substrates] is not appropriate. For, in that case if the inference were simply formulated as: ‘Trope, etc., are not different from the thing that possesses the trope and so on[, since they are placed in grammatical apposition with the thing that possesses them]’, then [the reason,] ‘being grammatically coordinated’, would not be determinative in respect of the probandum. For, [we] do not observe the use of the expression ‘A pot (*ghaṭaḥ*) is a pot (*kalaśa*)’ in the case of things such as ‘pot’ (*ghaṭaḥ*) and ‘pot’ (*kalaśa*), [which are identical with one another and therefore] possess the probandum in the form of ‘non-difference’. In this context, ‘not being determinative of’ (*aprayojakatā*) does not mean that the reason may be present where the probandum is absent. Rather, it means that the reason is not determinative of the probandum because the reason is absent even though the probandum is present, as in the expression ‘For, something that is absent when x is present, [or] present when x is absent, is not determinative of x’.”

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 1)**

nāpi vyarthaviśeṣyatvam iti. yatheśvarānumāne kṛtimajjanyam iti sādhyakaraṇa-mātreṇāpīśvarasiddhāv api cikīrṣāder viśeṣaṇasya na vaiyarthyam, vyāpakaviśe-ṣaṇānām uddeśyapratītyarthatvāt.

yathā bhedābhedavādinā tārīkikaṃ prati prayukte bhinnābhinnam iti sādhye bhinnatviśeṣaṇasya tārīkāṅgīkṛtatve 'pi na vaiyarthyam, tatpratīter uddeśya-tvāt; tathehāpi sadvilakṣaṇatve saty asadvilakṣaṇatvam iti pratīter uddeśyatvān na vyarthaviśeṣyatvam ity arthaḥ.

samānādhikṛtatvād iti. śuklaḥ paṭa iti sāmānādhikaraṇyavattvād ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 59.)<sup>57</sup>

**Translation**

“[If we adopt M<sup>3</sup> as the definition of “illusoriness”, then the probandum in Ānanda-bodha’s inferences] would not have a pointless qualificandum ...” (*nāpi vyarthaviśeṣyatvam*). In the [Naiyāyikas’] inference [to prove the existence] of god, even though the existence of god could be established if the probandum were merely stated to be “produced by one who possesses effort” (*kṛtimat-janyam*), the quali-fiers “[possessing] a desire to make” (*cikīrṣā*) and “[having an immediate cognition of the material cause” (*upādāna-aparokṣa-jñapti*)] are not without purpose. For, the qualifiers attached to the thing that pervades [the reason (i.e. “effort”)] are there to give rise to the judgment that [the inference] is intended to produce.

[Or,] take [the inference] where one who believes that [tropes and so on] are both different and non-different [from the substrates in which they inhere] uses the probandum “both different *and* non-different” (*bhinnābhinna*) to persuade the Naiyāyika [of their position]. Here, even though the qualifier [in the probandum]—“differentiatedness” (*bhinnatva*)—is [already] accepted by the Naiyāyika [who ac-cepts that tropes and other properties are simply different from the substrates in which they inhere, that qualifier] is not without purpose. For, [the inference] seeks to bring about that cognition [(i.e. a cognition of difference compounded with non-difference)]. Likewise, in the present case of [Ānandabodha’s inferences], since [the inferences] aim to produce the judgment “[The world has] the quality of being differ-ent from what is nonexistent qualified by the quality of being different from what is existent”, it cannot be objected that the qualificandum portion [of M<sup>3</sup>] is without purpose.

“Because [tropes and so on] are placed in grammatical apposition [with their substrates] ...” (*samānādhikṛtatvāt*). [Vyāsātīrtha] means: “Because [tropes and

57 NAK: 111; NATMu: 13r.

their substrates] possess the quality of being placed in grammatical apposition, as in the statement “The cloth is white”.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 2)

nanv īśvarānumāne jñānādighaṭitaṃ sādhyatrayam evābhipretam iti na tad dṛ-  
ṣṭāntaḥ. bhedābhedānumāne tv aprayojakatvaparihārāya bhinnatvaviśeṣaṇasyod-  
deśyatety āśaṅkya prakṛte 'pi tathety āha yadi ceti.

“guṇādikam guṇyādinābhinnam, samānādhikṛtatvāt” ity eva kṛte 'bhedarūpa-  
sādhyavaty api ghaṭakalaśādāv avidyamānasya samānādhikṛtatvasyābhedarūpa-  
sādhyam praty aprayojakatvam syāt. tad uktam—tasmin saty abhavataḥ, tena vi-  
nāpi bhavataḥ, tadaprayojakatvād iti. ato 'prayojakatvam ity arthaḥ. (NAB: 59.)<sup>58</sup>

### Translation

*Objection:* In the [Naiyāyika's] inference [to prove that the world is created by] god, what is really meant is that there are three separate probanda—a [direct] cognition [of the material cause, a desire to create, and effort itself]. Hence, that inference cannot serve as precedent [for showing that the qualificandum in M<sup>3</sup> is without purpose]. In the case of the inference to prove that [tropes and so on] are both different and non-different [from their substrates], on the other hand, it might be supposed that the qualifier “differentiatedness” [is inserted into the probandum] in order to avert the contingency that [otherwise the reason] would not determine [the probandum]. Acknowledging that the same could be said in the present case [of the Advaitins' inferences, Vyāsātīrtha] says: “And if ...” (*yadi ca*).

Let us assume that the inference [pressed against the Naiyāyikas] was simply “Tropes and [other properties] are non-different from the things that possess tropes and [other properties], since [tropes and other properties are] placed in grammatical apposition [with the things that possess them]”. In that case, the reason (“being-placed-in-grammatical-apposition”) would not be determinative of the probandum (“being non-different”), since [the quality of being placed in grammatical apposition] is absent from the case of “pot (*ghaṭa*) and pot (*kalaśa*)”, even though they possess the probandum in the form of being non-different [from one another]. As it is said: “Something (y) is not determinative of something else (x) if y is absent when x is present [or] y is present even when x is absent”. Therefore, [the reason] would not be determinative [of the probandum if the reason simply consisted in “non-difference”]. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means.

<sup>58</sup> NAK: 111–112; NATMu: 13v.

## 9.10 TEXT 10: The flaw of *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛta*)

... tathāpy aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam. “pr̥thivī itarabhinna” ity atra tv anekadharmasāadhanapakṣa eva pratyekaprasiddhyā sādhyaprasiddhir uktā. anyathā śaśādīnāṃ pratyekaṃ prasiddhyā śaśaśṛṅgollikhitatvasyāpi sā syāt. (NAB: 53.)<sup>59</sup>

### Translation

... Nevertheless, [if we adopt M<sup>3</sup> as the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences, then the subject of those inferences] has an unestablished qualifier/probandum (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*). In the case of the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”, on the other hand, it is only according to the view that [that inference] proves multiple, distinct qualities [to be present in the substance earth] that [I] accept that the probandum is established on the ground that [each of the absences that comprise it] are established separately. Otherwise, since hare[, horn, and the quality of “being-scratched”] are individually established, it would follow that the state of “being scratched by a hare’s horn” would be equally [well-established, and hence we could make inferences involving hares’ horns and other nonexistent entities].

### Comments

This text marks the end of Vyāsātīrtha’s concessions about M<sup>3</sup>, and concludes the long argument begun above in TEXT 7. Vyāsātīrtha has tentatively conceded in TEXT 8 and TEXT 9 that if the Advaitin adopts M<sup>3</sup> as their preferred analysis of “indeterminacy”, then Ānandabodha’s inferences might not be accused of proving something that is already established (*siddhasādhana*). He has also conceded that the qualificandum in M<sup>3</sup> (“possessing the constant absence of nonexistence”) is not pointless. Nevertheless, he argues that even if these flaws do not apply, M<sup>3</sup> is an unestablished quality, and, as such, it cannot serve as the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences. Mādhva philosophers accept that we can, in fact, make inferences involving empty terms. However, Vyāsātīrtha here seems to adopt the stance of the Naiyāyikas and assume that such inferences can never be valid.

The Advaitin might argue that the constant absences of existence and nonexistence can be established separately, as distinct qualities in different locations prior to the inferences’ being made. This might be true, but they are not established

<sup>59</sup> NAMu: 26v–27r; NAK: 113–143.

as qualifier/qualificandum in a single location. The fact that they are individually established is beside the point so far as  $M^3$  is concerned. Advaitin philosophers of course argue that the qualified property in question is established in the silver superimposed on mother-of-pearl, but Vyāsātīrtha and the Mādhvas deny that this is so.

Vyāsātīrtha anticipates an objection to this argument, based on the inference to define earth. When discussing this inference in TEXT 6, Vyāsātīrtha assumed that the probandum in the inference consists of thirteen separate mutual absences. He concluded that the entire probandum could still be said to be established if all of these absences were established individually, in different substrates, before the inference takes place. However, as Śrīnivāsatīrtha points out, the probandum in the earth-inference could also be interpreted as a compound/qualified entity. Instead of assuming that the probandum is composed of thirteen distinct qualities (the difference from water and the other substances and categories besides earth/substance), we might say that the probandum consists in the difference from inherence (the final category on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika list of categories, excepting absence), qualified by the aggregate of differences from the twelve remaining substances and categories. In other words the probandum would be the qualified entity “*b* qualified by *a*”, where:

*a* = the mutual absence of water, fire, wind, etc.

*b* = the mutual absence of inherence.

The problem is that under this analysis the probandum in the earth-inference seems to be an unestablished quality. None of the tropes/categories apart from earth could contain such a compound of properties. Water, for instance, might be said to be different from all substances and categories apart from itself, but water obviously cannot be different from *water/itself*. The same is true of all the remaining substances and categories—none will have the complete combination of differences that together render earth “different from the remaining substances and categories”.

Vyāsātīrtha’s solution to this problem is simply to emphasise that from his point of view, the earth-inference is valid if, and only if, we interpret the probandum to consist of several distinct properties, rather than a qualified entity. This is consistent with what he has already said about the earth-inference when analysing  $M^2$  (see above, *Nyāyāmṛta*, TEXT 6).

Vyāsātīrtha strengthens his argument with a *reductio ad absurdum*. If we accept that a qualified/compound entity is established provided its individual components are established, then we open the door to all sorts of absurd inferences. Śrīnivāsatīrtha gives the example of the inference “The earth is scratched by a hare’s horn, because it possesses earthness”. This is an example of an invalid in-

ference, which explains a part of reality by asserting the existence of an unexam-pled/nonexistent thing. However, if we assume that the probandum consists in a qualified entity, it could be argued that since the components which make up the probandum (the hare, horn, etc.) are separately established prior to the inference, the compound of those things is also established. Hence a clearly unacceptable inference could be regarded as valid if we accept that qualified/compound entities are established simply because their components are individually established.

### Sanskrit text (*Advaitasiddhi*)

ata eva sattvātyantābhāvavattve saty asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭaṃ sādhyam  
ity api sādhu.

na ca militasya viśiṣṭasya vā sādhyatve tasya kutrāpy aprasiddhyāprasiddhavi-  
śeṣaṇatvam. pratyekaṃ <sup>[1]</sup>prasiddhyā<sup>[1]</sup> militasya viśiṣṭasya vā sādhanā <sup>[2]</sup>śaśaṣṭ-  
gayoḥ pratyekaṃ prasiddhyā<sup>[2]</sup> <sup>[3]</sup>śaśiśaṣṭga<sup>[3]</sup> sādhanam api syād iti vācyam. ta-  
thāvidhaprasiddheḥ śūktirūpya evoktatvāt.

na ca nirdharmakatvād brahmaṇaḥ sattvāsattvarūpadharmadvayaśūnyatvena  
tatrātivyāptiḥ. sadrūpatvena brahmaṇas tadatyantābhāvānadhikaraṇatvāt, nir-  
dharmakatvenaivābhāvarūpadharmānadhikaraṇatvāc ceti dik. (NAB: 55.)<sup>60</sup>

1. siddhyā AS<sub>Mu</sub>, AS<sub>My</sub>
2. *om*. K<sup>D</sup>
3. śaśaṣṭga K<sup>D</sup>

### Translation

The very reasons [so far outlined in defence of M<sup>2</sup>] also show that there is no prob-lem with the claim that the probandum is a qualified/compound entity in the form of “[possessing] the constant absence of nonexistence while possessing the constant absence of existence” [i.e. M<sup>3</sup>].

*Objection* (Vyāsatīrtha): If the probandum [in Ānandabodha’s inferences] were a compound (*milita*) or a qualified entity (*viśiṣṭa*), then, since [the probandum] would be unestablished in any location [before the inferences take place, the sub-ject in the inferences] would have an unestablished qualifier. For, if we could establish a compound or qualified entity provided that each of its components were individually established, it would follow that since hare and horn are both established individually, we could infer the existence of a horn belonging to a hare!

60 AS<sub>Mu</sub>: 79–90; AS<sub>My</sub>: 40–46; AS<sub>V</sub>: 47–51; K<sup>D</sup>: 4r; NAK: 143–155.

*Reply:* Do not argue as such! For, we have already pointed out that [the probandum] defined as such is already established in the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl.

*Objection:* [If “illusoriness” is defined as  $M^3$ , then] it applies inappropriately to *brahman*. For[, in your view,] *brahman* is free from qualities. It therefore must lack the pair of qualities “existence” and “nonexistence” [and thus must possess  $M^3$ , which consists in the compound of the absences of these two qualities].

*Reply:* This is wrong! For, since *brahman* is[, in our view,] existent by essence, it does not have the constant absence [of existence]. And, the very fact that [*brahman*] is free of qualities means that it cannot have a negative quality [any more than it can have a positive one, and hence it cannot possess the constant absences of existence and nonexistence]. This is the direction of [my thought].

### Comments

In his answer to the first objection in this passage, Madhusūdana is referring to his response to the charge of *sādhyavaikalya* in TEXT 8. Recall that Madhusūdana has defined nonexistence as “not being the locus of the state of being cognised as existent in some substrate” (*kva cid apy upādhanau sattvena pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvam*). Madhusūdana therefore argued that “indeterminacy” consists in: “Being cognised as existent in some location while being different from what is not sublatale in all three times” (*trikālābādhyavilakṣaṇatve sati kva cid apy upādhanau sattvena pratīyamānatvam*). The Mādhyas do not claim that the “silver” in question lacks the first part of the probandum defined in this way, because they agree that it lacks omnitemporal *non*-sublatableity. Moreover, the Mādhyas cannot deny that this “silver” has the second part of the probandum. They clearly cannot deny that the “silver” is falsely taken to exist in the mother-of-pearl by the victim of the illusion. Consequently, the flaw of *sādhyavaikalya* evaporates, and with it Vyāsātīrtha’s objection.

Madhusūdana takes up one final problem before the end of this chapter of the *Advaitasiddhi*. If *brahman* lacks qualities, it must lack the qualities of existence and nonexistence. This being so, could it not be said that *brahman* has the “constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the constant absence of existence” and, therefore, that it too must possess Vyāsātīrtha’s third analysis of “illusoriness”? In response, Madhusūdana points out that the fact that the Advaitins accept that *brahman* is existent by essence surely implies that it cannot have the “constant absence of existence”. He sketches a further response to this line of argument. Absences are properties, just like “existence” and “nonexistence”. If *brahman* cannot possess “existence” and “nonexistence” because they are qualities, it cannot possess the *absences* of those qualities either. Consequently, it cannot have the absences of existence and

nonexistence, and it cannot be said to possess “indeterminacy”, however that term is interpreted.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 1)

tathāpy aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam iti. viśiṣṭasādhyasya saty asati cāprasiddhatvād ity arthaḥ. na ca suktirūpya evobhayābhāvaprasiddhir astīti vācyam, tatra sattvena pratiyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvarūpāsattvasyābhāve vidyamāne 'pi bādhyatvarūpasyāsattvasya vyatireko nāstīti prāg avocāma. (NAv: 59.)<sup>61</sup>

### Translation

“Nevertheless, [if “illusoriness” is interpreted as M<sup>3</sup>, then the subject in Ānanda-bodha’s inferences] has an unestablished qualifier/probandum ...” (*tathāpy aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam*). For, the qualified thing that constitutes the probandum [(M<sup>3</sup>)] is established neither in what is existent nor in what is nonexistent[, since each has only the constant absence of the state of being the other]. This is what [Vyāsātīrtha] means. Do not argue that both absences are established in the “silver” superimposed on mother-of-pearl. For, as I have said earlier [in my commentary on the PMBh], even though the absence of nonexistence in the form of “not being the locus of the quality of being experienced as existent” is absent [from the “silver”], nevertheless [the silver] does *not* have the absence of nonexistence in the form of “sublatability”[; and this is the “nonexistence” that you, the Advaitin, must be committed to proving of the world].

### Comments

The earlier passage that Rāmācārya refers to here is his response to Madhusūdana’s arguments against the charge of contradiction, which is translated above (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, TEXT 3).

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 2)

nanu yadi sattvābhāvaviśeṣitāsattvābhāvarūpaviśiṣṭasādhyāprasiddhyāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam, tadā jalādidvādaśānyonyābhāvaviśeṣitasamavāyānyonyābhāvarūpaviśiṣṭasādhyasyāpy aprasiddhatvena pratyekānyonyābhāvānām prasiddhyā sādhyaprasiddhyupavarṇanam virudhyetety ata āha—pṛthivīti.

<sup>61</sup> NAK: 113; NATMu: 14r.

“*pr̥thivī itarabhinna*” ity atra jalādidvādaśabhedaviśeṣitasamavāyabhedarū-  
pam viśiṣṭam na sādhyam, na vā trayodaśabhedānām aikādhikaranyam sādhya-  
tāvacchedakam, yenāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam syāt. kiṃ tu svasvādhikaraṇe vidya-  
mānānām trayodaśānyonyābhāvānām apekṣābuddhiviśayatvasamūhālamabanai-  
kajñānopārūḍhatvādirūpavyāsajyavṛttidharmāvacchinnaśādhyatākānām sādhya-  
tvam. tathā ca nāprasiddhiḥ, na vāsādhāraṇyam ity uktam iti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 59.)<sup>62</sup>

### Translation

*Objection:* If [one accepts that the] subject [in Ānandabodha’s inferences] has an unestablished qualifier simply because the probandum, which is a qualified entity in the form of “the absence of nonexistence qualified by the absence of existence”, is unestablished, then [Vyāsātīrtha] would be contradicting [his earlier] claim that the probandum [in the earth-inference] is established because the [thirteen] mutual absences are individually established [in different locations prior to the inference’s being made]. For, the probandum [in the earth-inference], which is a qualified entity in the form of the “mutual absence of inherence qualified by the twelve mutual absences of water [and the remaining substances and categories apart from earth and inherence]” is unestablished[, since it cannot exist in any location apart from earth]. In response [to this objection], Vyāsātīrtha says—“Earth ...” (*pr̥thivī*).

In the [inference], “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]”, the probandum is not a qualified entity consisting in the difference from inherence qualified by the twelve differences from water and [the remaining substances and categories apart from earth and inherence]. Nor is the state of sharing a common locus that belongs to the thirteen differences the determiner of probandumhood, by virtue of which the [subject] would have an unestablished qualifier/probandum. No, probandumhood belongs to the thirteen mutual absences each existing in their respective locus, and each possessing probandumhood determined by a collectively present property in the form of “being the object of an aggregating cognition”, [or] “being grasped in a single collective cognition”, etc. Thus it is said that [the probandum in the earth-inference] is not unestablished, nor is [its] reason[—earthness—]a pseudo-reason of the “uncommon” variety. This is the idea [behind Vyāsātīrtha’s words here].

62 NAK: 113; NATMu: 13v–14r.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, 3)**

nanu sattvābhāvāsattvābhāvayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣayayoḥ prasiddhyā tad viśiṣṭam api prasiddham eva. viśiṣṭasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyām anatiṛekāt; anyathā kṣaṇikatvā-patter ity ata āha—anyatheti. pratyekaprasiddhyā yadi viśiṣṭaprasiddhiḥ, tadety arthaḥ. viśiṣṭam tu tvaṇmate 'py atiriktam eveti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 59–60.)<sup>63</sup>

**Translation**

*Objection:* Since the absences of existence and nonexistence, which are, respectively, the qualifier and the qualificandum [in M<sup>3</sup>], are [individually] well-established, it follows that the qualified entity [comprising them] must be well-established too. For, a qualified entity is nothing more than [its] qualifier and qualificandum. Otherwise, it would follow that [everything] is momentary [as Buddhist philosophers claim]! With this [objection] in mind, Vyāsātīrtha says: “Otherwise ...” (*anyathā*). What [Vyāsātīrtha] means is: “If the qualified thing is well-established because the [qualifier and the qualificandum are,] individually, well-established, then [invalid inferences like the one to prove that the earth is scratched by a hare’s horn would have to be considered as valid]”.

**Comments**

Rāmācārya’s final comment in this chapter reflects a debate about the ontological status of the “qualified entity” (*viśiṣṭa*). Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers take a reductionist stance and argue that the *viśiṣṭa* is nothing over and above the combination of the qualifier, the qualificandum, and the relationship between the two. Mādhva philosophers, by contrast, recognise the *viśiṣṭa* as a separate entity, a whole over and above the sum of its parts.<sup>64</sup> Rāmācārya frames Vyāsātīrtha’s argument as a response to a line of argument assuming the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory to be correct. If, as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers claim, the *viśiṣṭa* is nothing but the sum of its components, then surely the *viśiṣṭa* should be established if those components are individually established?

Rāmācārya responds that taking this position seems to lead to the absurd consequence that Vyāsātīrtha points out in the *Nyāyāmṛta*. Why should we not conclude that the “hare’s horn” is established simply because we are familiar with hares and horns separately? Rāmācārya points out, moreover, that this argument would be inconsistent with the Advaitins’ own ontological positions. According to Rāmācārya, the Advaitins themselves reject the reductionist stance of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philoso-

<sup>63</sup> NAK: 133; NATMu: 13v.

<sup>64</sup> See Sharma (1986: 101–103) for an account of the theory of *viśiṣṭas* in these different traditions.

phers and hold, like the Mādhvas, that the *viśiṣṭa* is an entity over and above the sum of its parts.

### Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 1)

nanu yadi sattvātyantābhāvavattve saty asattvātyantābhāvarūpaviśiṣṭasādhane 'prasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam, tadā “pr̥thivī itarabhinnā” ity atrāpi jalādidvādaśānyonyābhāvavattve sati samavāyānyonyābhāvarūpaviśiṣṭasyaiva sādhyatvam aṅgikṛtya tasya kutrāpy aprasiddhatvenāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam tatrāpi syāt. tathā ca trayodaśānyonyābhāvānāṃ pratyekaṃ prasiddhyā sādhyaprasiddhivyutpādanam vyāhataṃ syād ity ata āha—pr̥thivīti. (NAB: 66.)<sup>65</sup>

### Translation

*Objection:* Let us assume that [the subject in Ānandabodha's inferences] has an unestablished qualifier/probandum on the grounds that what is established [by those inferences is “indeterminacy” interpreted as] a qualified entity in the form of “the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by the state of possessing the constant absence of existence”. In that case, if we accept that the probandum in the inference “Earth is different from the remaining [substances and categories, because it has earthness]” is simply a compound entity in the form of the mutual absence of inherence qualified by the state of possessing the [remaining] twelve mutual absences from water and so on, then it follows that since that [compound entity] is not established in any locus [before the inference takes place], the flaw of [the subject's] having-an-unestablished-qualifier applies equally [to the (valid) earth-inference]. And so [Vyāsatīrtha's earlier] statement that the probandum [in the earth-inference] is established since the thirteen mutual absences are established separately [before the inference takes place] would be contradicted. For this reason does [Vyāsatīrtha] say: “Earth ...” (*pr̥thivī*).<sup>66</sup>

<sup>65</sup> NAMu: 26v–27r; NAPB: 49.

<sup>66</sup> Śrīnivāsatīrtha probably has in mind here an objection that Gaṅgeśa considers in the *siddhānta* portion of his *Kevalavyatirekivāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TCA: 609–612). See Phillips (2020: 788–789) for a translation and a discussion of this passage.

**Sanskrit text (*Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*, 2)**

sādhanaapakṣa eveti. noktariṭyā viśiṣṭasādhanaapakṣa iti vākyaseṣaḥ. viśiṣṭasya sādhyatāpakṣe tu samudāyālabhanarūpaikajñānopārūḍhatvam ādāya na sādhyaprasiddhisampādanaṃ sambhavaṭīti draṣṭavyam.

nanu viśiṣṭasya sādhyatve 'pi nāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam, sadvailakṣaṇyādīnāṃ viśakalitānāṃ prasiddhisambhavād ity ata āha—anyatheti. “bhūḥ śaśaviśāṇollīkhitā, bhūtvāt” ity atrāpy aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvaṃ sarvasammataṃ na syāt. tatrāpi śaśādīnāṃ viśakalitānāṃ prasiddhisambhavād iti bhāvaḥ. (NAB: 66.)<sup>67</sup>

**Translation**

“Only according to the view that [the earth-inference proves that earth has multiple, distinct qualities] ...” (*sādhanaapakṣa eva*). What needs to be added to [Vyāsatīrtha’s] statement is: “... [and] not according to the view that what is established is a compound entity, in the way [I] have just outlined”. It should be observed that if we do accept that the probandum is a qualified entity, then it cannot be established insofar as [its individual components] are grasped in a single, collective cognition.

*Objection:* Even if the probandum [in the Advaitin’s inferences] is a compound entity, it does not follow that the flaw of *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā* applies, because the states of being different from what is existent [and of being different from what is nonexistent] can be established separately[, in different locations, before the inference takes place]. In response to this, [Vyāsatīrtha] says: “Otherwise ...” (*anyathā*). In the inference “The earth has been scratched by a hare’s horn, because [it has] earthness”, there would not be universal agreement that the flaw of *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā* applies. For, [in this inference] too, the hare [and the horn] might be individually well-established [in different locations before the inference takes place]. This is the idea [behind Vyāsatīrtha’s words here].

<sup>67</sup> NAMu: 27v; NAPB: 49.