

## 8 Introduction to the translation of the *Prathamamithyātvabhaṅga*

Chapter 9 contains a translation of the complete text of the *Prathamamithyātvabhaṅga* (“Refutation of the First Definition of Illusoriness”, PMBh) chapter of the *Nyāyāmṛta*, along with translations from some of its most important commentaries. The PMBh is found directly after the Advaita *pūrvapakṣa*, and thus marks the beginning of Vyāsātīrtha’s long critique of Advaita philosophy in the *Nyāyāmṛta*. In the PMBh, Vyāsātīrtha’s main objective is to prove that “indeterminacy” is not fit to be taken as the probandum in the three inferences he ascribed to Ānandabodha in the *pūrvapakṣa* section of the text. Once again, these inferences are:

1. “The world is illusory, because [it is] perceptible; just like the silver [superimposed] on mother-of-pearl” (*jagan mithyā, dṛśyatvāt; śuktirūpyavat*);
2. “The world is illusory, because [it is] finite; just like the silver [superimposed] on mother-of-pearl” (*jagan mithyā, paricchinnatvāt; śuktirūpyavat*);
3. “The world is illusory, because [it is] insentient; just like the silver [superimposed] on mother-of-pearl” (*jagan mithyā, jaḍatvāt; śuktirūpyavat*).

The first definition of “illusoriness” that Vyāsātīrtha considers in his critique of Advaita in the *Nyāyāmṛta* is “indeterminacy”. Again, in the *Nyāyāmṛta* Vyāsātīrtha follows Citsukha in defining “indeterminacy” as *sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvam*—“the state of being the locus of neither existence nor nonexistence”. The structure of the PMBh is simple. Vyāsātīrtha begins by setting out three possible analyses of Citsukha’s compound ( $M[\text{ithyā}tva]^1-M^3$ ) which differ from one another in subtle ways. He then cycles through these definitions, substituting each of them in turn for the probandum in Ānandabodha’s inferences. Vyāsātīrtha concludes that adopting each analysis of “indeterminacy” as the probandum in the inferences leads to unacceptable problems; thus the “illusoriness” that the Advaitin wants to prove about the world through these inferences cannot consist in indeterminacy. After concluding the PMBh, Vyāsātīrtha goes on to refute the four remaining definitions of *mithyātva* that he takes seriously in the *Nyāyāmṛta*, before setting out a case against the concept of illusoriness in general and critiquing the different reasons put forward by the Advaitins in their inferences.

In addition to the full translation of the PMBh, I have further translated Maḍhusūdana’s response to this chapter of the *Nyāyāmṛta* in the *Advaitasiddhi* as well as selections from three Mādhva commentaries: Rāmācārya’s *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī*, Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka’s *Nyāyāmṛtakāṇṭhakodhāra*, and Śrīnivāsatīrtha’s *Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa*. In the footnotes, I occasionally translate extracts from Balabhadra’s

*Advaitasiddhivyākhyā*, Brahmānanda's *Laghucandrikā*, and Bagchi's *Bālabodhinī* commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi*.

## 8.1 Notes on the translation and Navya-Nyāya technical terms

Translating texts such as the *Nyāyāmṛta* and its commentaries is a challenging task. Vyāsatīrtha's work and its commentaries were written for an elite audience who would have already been deeply familiar with the theories and technical terms used by their authors, including the works of the classical Advaitins and the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. One consequence of this is that these works are highly elliptical in character, and crucial premises of arguments are frequently omitted from the text. Like Gaṅgeśa, Vyāsatīrtha often combines complex chains of reasoning into long, elaborate sentences where crucial premises are sometimes tucked away as seemingly inconsequential adjectives. Another feature of these texts which makes them particularly difficult to translate is their highly legalistic style. Typically, when critiquing some argument, Vyāsatīrtha adduces a long list of definitions of the key terms of that argument, then examines each in turn, showing that they somehow lead to unacceptable consequences. The reasons adduced to show why each definition fails usually consist in technical terms drawn from works of logical theory, which condense complex chains of reasoning into a single word or compound.

These features alone make texts like the *Nyāyāmṛta* formidably difficult to translate into clear English; an overly-literal approach would probably do little to make their meaning clear to modern audiences. My strategy has been to make the translations as explicit as possible by supplying a lot of additions in square brackets. In the translation, I have frequently divided up what appear as single sentences in the Sanskrit text into shorter ones for the sake of making Vyāsatīrtha's complex chains of reasoning easier to follow. After the translation of each section of the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Advaitasiddhi*, and *Taraṅginī*, I have attempted to reconstruct the passage's argument in plain(er) English, explaining the various technical terms that are used by the authors, giving the wider philosophical background to their arguments, and reconstructing the complex arguments which are expressed using so few Sanskrit words.

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the translation, however, lies in rendering into English the Navya-Nyāya technical language which Vyāsatīrtha and his commentators use throughout their writing. Navya-Nyāya provided these philosophers a rich toolbox of technical terms to deploy in various contexts to express their arguments more precisely than would be possible in normal Sanskrit. While various aspects of this terminology are found in the *Nyāyāmṛta* itself, the commentarial literature becomes progressively more technical in this regard. The various Mādhva and

Advaitin commentators increasingly looked to Navya-Nyāya as they analysed their critiques of one another. Among the early commentators, Rāmācārya and Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka in particular both make extensive use of Navya-Nyāya language, primarily to help prove that the formal inferential fallacies Vyāsātīrtha cites against the Advaitins in the PMBh really do apply to their inferences.

Before translating the PMBh and its commentaries, I will give some explanation of how I have translated the main Navya-Nyāya terms of art that appear in the *Nyāyāmṛta* and its literature. Ingalls (1951), Goekoop (1967), Matilal (1968), Wada (2007), and Ganeri (2011) have all given detailed accounts of the Navya-Nyāya technical language. One of the main technical terms used by Vyāsātīrtha and his commentators is *avacchedaka*. I have translated this term as “determiner” throughout this volume, although it has also been translated as “limiter”<sup>1</sup> and “specifier”<sup>2</sup> by modern scholars. According to Ingalls (1951: 44), the term is primarily used in Navya-Nyāya in connection with what he referred to as “relational abstracts”. These are abstract properties that appear adventitiously in individuals and connect them to different parts of reality. Such abstract properties are frequently marked with the suffixes *tā/tva* in philosophical literature. They include, for instance, “causeness” (*kāraṇatā*), “effectness” (*kāryatā*), “counterpositiveness” (*pratīyogitā*), and “objectness” (*viṣaya-tva*). Such properties explain why we judge things to stand in a certain relation to something else—“x is the cause of y”, “x is an effect of y”, etc. According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, these relational abstracts are not repeatable qualities/universals; they are rather “imposed properties” (*upādhis*) that are unique in every case (Matilal, 1968: 73).

In itself, a relational abstract like “causeness” is a very vague thing. What exactly possesses this instance of causeness? And why? What quality of the numerous ones that the cause in question possesses determines the fact that it is a cause? And what is that thing the cause of? The Navya-Naiyāyikas make use of the terms *avacchedaka/avacchinna* (“determiner”/“determined”) and *nirūpaka/nirūpita* (“describer”/“described”) to specify relational abstracts by indicating their extension and connection with other relational properties. From one point of view, a “determiner” simply specifies the mode under which a thing enters into relations with other things in reality. A very common usage of the term *avacchedaka* in the *Nyāyāmṛta* literature is to specify the relational abstracts that appear in things as they become involved in the process of making inferences. The Navya-Naiyāyikas take it that properties like “subjecthood” (*pakṣatā*), “probandumhood” (*sādhya-tā*), and

1 Ingalls (1951) and Matilal (1968 *et al.*) both translate the term as such.

2 Phillips (2020) renders the word as such throughout his translation of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

“reasonhood” (*hetutā*) are particular instances of relational properties that appear in individuals as they become the object of certain sorts of mental judgment.

In the standard inference where fire is inferred from the presence of smoke, for example, we can say that:

- Determiner of probandumhood (*sādhyatā-avacchedaka*) = fireness (*vahnitā*),
- Determiner of subjecthood (*pakṣatā-avacchedaka*) = mountainness (*parvatatva*),
- Determiner of reasonhood (*hetutā-avacchedaka*) = smokeness (*dhūmatva*).

The determiners in this example (“mountainness” and so on) are all universals. They comprise the underlying qualities that, of the numerous qualities present in fire, mountain, and smoke, serve to specify the relational abstracts “probandumhood”, etc., in those individuals. However, relational abstracts are also determined by the different types of relators (*sambandha*) accepted by the Navya-Naiyāyikas. For instance, in the case where we infer that there is fire on some mountain because we see smoke there, the fire is present on that mountain through the relationship of “contact” (*saṃyoga*), and not, say, inherence. Thus, we could further specify the particular probandumhood in the fire/smoke inference by referring to the “probandumhood that is determined by [both] the contact relator and by the property of fireness” (*saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-vahnitva-avacchinna-sādhyatā*).

As discussed by Vyāsatīrtha and his commentators in the PMBh, it is possible for relational abstracts to be determined by multiple qualities. For instance, the inference that “Speech and mind are noneternal, because they are effects” ascribes a single probandum (noneternality) to two different subjects—speech and mind. In this case, one could say that the subjecthood in this inference is determined by both speechness and mindness. Similarly, when the Advaitins claim that “The world lacks both existence and nonexistence”, the probandum could be interpreted analytically, in which case the inference could be taken to ascribe two distinct properties (the constant absences of existence and nonexistence) to the world. In this case, we would say probandumhood is determined by two separate qualities—“the state of being the constant absence of existence” and “the state of being the constant absence of nonexistence”.

The Advaitins’ claim about the world could also be interpreted synthetically, as one that ascribes *the compound* of these two separate qualities to the world. To show this, Vyāsatīrtha makes use of the term *viśiṣṭa*. As Ingalls (1951: 69, fn. 137) points out, this term is frequently used in philosophical works to mean that something is “distinguished” or “qualified” by something else, for instance as a blue pot is distinguished/qualified by potness and the colour blue. (It is worth noting that the term *avacchinna* itself is frequently used in this sense of *viśiṣṭa* by the commenta-

tors on the *Nyāyāmṛta*.<sup>3</sup>) However, Ingalls points out that the term *viśiṣṭa* can simply mean “accompanied by”/“coupled with”, or “an accompanied/compound thing”. It is frequently used in this sense by Vyāsātīrtha and his commentators in the PMBh.<sup>4</sup> This sense of the term is often expressed using locative absolute constructions. Thus Vyāsātīrtha expresses his third analysis of “indeterminacy” as follows:

*sattva-atyanta-abhāvavattve saty asattva-atyanta-abhāvavattvam* (“The state of possessing the constant absence of nonexistence while possessing the constant absence of existence”).

This is equivalent to:

*sattva-atyanta-abhāvavattva-viśiṣṭa-asattva-atyanta-abhāvavattvam* (“The state of possessing the constant absence of nonexistence qualified by/combined with the constant absence of existence”).

Another approach to a seemingly “partite” probandum which is demonstrated in the commentarial literature on the PMBh is to say that the quality of probandumhood is determined by a “collectively present” (*vyāsajyavṛtti*) quality. This type of property is closely connected with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of numbers. With the exception of the number one, numbers are considered to be collectively present qualities by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The *Nyāyakośa*<sup>5</sup> explains that such qualities are produced in objects through “enumerative judgments”. An enumerative judgment is one that aggregates different things together, for instance: “This is one pot, this is another pot; together there are two pots”. Numbers greater than one are regarded as tropes which are produced in the substances that become the object of such judgments. Such numbers are not entirely present (*paryāpti*) in any one of their loci; rather, they are only completely present in their loci taken collectively. Hence they are said to be “collectively present” qualities. Relational abstracts are often said to be determined by such qualities according the Navya-Naiyāyikas, as opposed to being determined by multiple distinct qualities. Rāmācārya makes use

3 See Ingalls (1951: p. 40, fn. 43, and 157–158) for a discussion of how the term *viśiṣṭa* is used in this sense. Wada (1990) seems to follow this approach in his translation of the *Vyāptivāda* of Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. However, Goekoop (1967: 14) interprets the term differently in this context. Goekoop says that the term *avacchinna* is used in this sense in connection with the nature of an entity, since it is determined by its abstract character.

4 In the entry for the term *viśiṣṭa* (NK: 779), the *Nyāyakośa* says that the term *viśiṣṭya* can mean “association” or “collocatedness” (*atra viśiṣṭyaṃ ca sāhityaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vā jñeyam*).

5 NK: 849–850.

of this approach when defending the inference to define earth against the charge that its reason is “uncommon”, for instance.<sup>6</sup>

The Mādhvas, Advaitins, and Naiyāyikas all had different positions on the ontological status of the *viśiṣṭa*, and the commentators sometimes allude to this debate. At the end of his commentary on the PMBh,<sup>7</sup> Rāmācārya references the debate about the ontological status of the *viśiṣṭa* as an entity over and above the sum of its parts. The Mādhvas and Advaitins both agree that the *viśiṣṭa* is a whole above the sum of its parts, whereas the Naiyāyikas take a reductionist stance and argue that it is nothing but the combination of the parts that constitute it—the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*), and their relationship (*sambandha*). Rāmācārya and Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka<sup>8</sup> further discuss the theory regarding the different circumstances under which a qualified thing can be absent from its locus.

Determiners can also be used to quantify relational abstracts in their generic form (Ingalls, 1951: 48). They might be used to help clarify the meaning of the statement “Pot-maker is cause of pot” (*kulālo ghaṭakāraṇam*), for example. The Navya-Naiyāyikas would say that when a potter fabricates a pot from clay, a relational abstract “causeness” appears in “potter” and another relational abstract, “effectness”, appears in “pot”. The term *nirūpita* (“described [by]”) is used to indicate that these relational abstracts are connected to/correlated with one another. Thus, on one level of analysis, the statement *kulālo ghaṭakāraṇam* says that there is a relational abstract causeness that is “located in potter” and is “described by” an effectness that is “located in pot” (*ghaṭa-niṣṭha-kāryatā-nirūpita-kulāla-niṣṭha-kāraṇatā*).

However, without further parsing, it is not completely clear what is being said when one refers to “the causeness located in potter described by the effectness located in pot”. The statement could be interpreted as a singular statement that a particular potter is a cause of a particular pot. Then again, it could be interpreted as a universal statement: that pots in general are brought into being by pot-makers. The terms *avacchedaka/avacchinna* can help to make this distinction clear. According to the explanation of the nineteenth-century Navya-Nyāya scholar Maheśacandra, to say that a relational abstract is “determined” by some property in such cases means to say that the relational abstract is present wherever the property in question is present.

In his introduction to the Navya-Nyāya language, the *Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa*, Maheśacandra explains that the primary purpose of a determiner is to delineate/restrict the “location-range” of the relational property, that is, to circumscribe

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 9, TEXT 6. As I will explain shortly, my translation of the PMBh and its commentaries in that chapter is divided into ten separate segments of text.

<sup>7</sup> See below, TEXT 10, *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅgiṇī*.

<sup>8</sup> TEXT 2.

the precise scope of the things in which it is present. The *avacchedaka* is thus said to act as the “restrictor” (*niyāmaka*) of the relational property, and that property is thus said to be “restricted” (*niyata*) by its determiner. Thus, to speak of “effectness determined by potness” (*ghaṭatva-avacchinna-kāryatā*) means to speak of an effectness that is present in all pots; it is to speak of pots *in general* as being an effect of something-or-other. Thus we can say that “pots in general are created by pot-makers” by the following expression: *ghaṭatva-avacchinna-kāryatā-nirūpita-kulālatva-avacchinna-kāraṇatā* (“the causeness that is determined by pot-makerhood, and which is described by the effectness that is determined by potness”).

A closely related expression which is used frequently by the Navya-Naiyāyikas is the term *-avacchedena*, which is contrasted with its counterpart *-sāmānādhikaranyena*. Both expressions appear frequently in the commentaries on the PMBh of Rāmācārya and Ānanda Bhaṭṭāraka, where they are generally used at the end of compounds. Maheśacandra provides a clear explanation of the distinction they draw:

[...] And the predicate (*vidheya*) is sometimes predicated as *sharing a common locus* with the determiner of qualificandumhood (*viśeṣyatā-avacchedaka-sāmānādhikaranyena*), and sometimes as *determined by* the determiner of qualificandumhood (*viśeṣyatā-avacchedaka-avacchedena*). Where [the predicate is predicated] to some single case of the qualificandum, then it is predicated as sharing a common locus with the determiner of qualificandumhood—it is postulated as occurring in *one* locus that is common to the determiner of qualificandumhood. For instance, in the statement “Brahmin is wise”, it is not stated that *all* brahmins are wise, but rather that wisdom is present in *some* of the locations where the quality brahminhood is present.

The postulation [of the predicate] as belonging to the entire qualificandum—in *every* qualificandum—that is, wherever the determiner of qualificandumhood is present, is the postulation [of the predicate] as determined by the determiner of qualificandumhood; in other words, as *pervading* the determiner of qualificandumhood. For instance, in the statement “Man is mortal”, “mortality” is not postulated of just some men, but of each and every man. Mortality is postulated as pervading manhood, that is, as being present in each and every man.<sup>9</sup>

9 *vidheyasya vidhānam ca kva cid viśeṣyatāvachedakasāmānādhikaranyena, kva cic ca viśeṣyatāvachedakāvachedena bhavati. yasmin kasminn api viśeṣye yad vidhānam, tat viśeṣyatāvachedakasāmānādhikaranyena—viśeṣyatāvachedakasya samāna ekasminn adhi-karaṇe vṛttitayā—vidhānam. yathā brāhmaṇo vidvān bhavattī anena na sarva eva brāhma-ṇaḥ vidvāṃso bhavantīti vidhiyate; kiṃ tu yatra yatra brāhmaṇyaṃ vartate, teṣāṃ madhye keṣu cid vidyā vartata iti. yatra yatra viśeṣyatāvachedako vartate, tatra sarvatraiva—arthāt sarvasminn eva—viśeṣye vidheyasya vidhānam, viśeṣyatāvachedakāvachedena—viśeṣyatāvachedakasyāvachedena, vyāptyā,—vidhānam. yathā manuṣyo maraṇaśīla ity anena*

In this passage, Maheśacandra contrasts two expressions:

1. “Brahmin [is] wise” (*brāhmaṇo vidvān*),

and

2. “Man [is] mortal” (*manuṣyo maraṇaśīlaḥ*).

Without further parsing, the meaning of these statements in Sanskrit is highly ambiguous. It is not immediately clear in either case whether the statement is a universal or a particular statement. Does the statement “Brahmin [is] wise” mean that “*All* brahmins are wise”, “*Some* Brahmins are wise”, or “*The* Brahmin is wise”? Similarly, it is not clear as such whether the statement “Man [is] mortal” attributes the property of mortality to a single man, some men, or all men.

Maheśacandra takes (1) as an example of a particular statement, effectively with the sense “At least one brahmin is wise”, or what as Matilal (1968: pp. 77–78) points out would be represented in PPL as:

$$(\exists x)(Bx \wedge Wx)$$

(where the predicates B and W represent “is a brahmin” and “is wise” respectively).

The second is a standard example of a universal statement, that is, “All men are mortal”, or what would be represented in PPL as:

$$(\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Mx)$$

(where the predicates H and M mean “is human” and “is mortal” respectively).<sup>10</sup>

These expressions are frequently used to specify what type of judgment an inference produces about its subject. Following Matilal, in this chapter I have trans-

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na keṣu cit manuṣyeṣu maraṇaśīlatvaṃ vidhīyate, kiṃ tu sarveṣv eva manuṣyeṣu. manuṣyatvaṃ vyāpya—sarveṣv eva manuṣyeṣu—maraṇaśīlatvaṃ vidhīyata iti. (NBhP: 129–130.)

<sup>10</sup> The Navya-Naiyāyikas often explained the expression -*avaccheda* using the concept of pervasion. The *Nyāyakośa* explains this as follows: ... *vyāptiḥ. yathā pakṣatāvachedakāvachedena sādhyasiddhāv ity ādau sādhyānirūpitā pakṣatāvachedakaniṣṭhā vyāptiḥ. atra vyāpakatvaṃ apy avacchedaśabdasyārthaḥ sambhavati. tathā ca pakṣatāvachedakavyāpakatvaviśiṣṭasādhyasiddhau iti bodhyaḥ*. “[‘Determination’ (*avaccheda*) can mean] pervasion. For instance, in the phrase, ‘When the probandum is established to be determined by the determiner of subjecthood ...’, the pervasion located in the determiner of subjecthood is described by the probandum. Here, the word ‘determination’ (*avaccheda*) may also mean the state of being the pervader (*vyāpakatva*). And so, the [phrase] should be understood as, ‘When there is the establishment of the probandum coupled with the state of being the pervader of the determiner of subjecthood’.”



lated the contrasting statements (1) *pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena sādhyasiddhiḥ* and (2) *pakṣatāvacchedakasāmānādhikaranyena sādhyasiddhiḥ* as:

1. “Establishment of the probandum as being determined by the/a determiner of subjecthood”,

and,

2. “Establishment of the reason as sharing a common locus with the/a determiner of probandumhood”.

## 8.2 Notes on the Sanskrit Text

For the translation, I have divided the PMBh into ten separate texts, each accompanied by translations and explanations of the selected commentaries on the text. All punctuation found in Sanskrit texts is my own. Reasons presented by Vyāsātīrtha and his commentators in favour of their claims are always given following a comma. I have marked formal inferences and fragments of formal inferences in the Sanskrit text by placing them in inverted commas. Vyāsātīrtha’s Mādhva commentators themselves coordinate their remarks on the *Nyāyāmṛta* by giving brief extracts from the root text (*pratīkas*). I have indicated the *pratīkas* found in the works of these commentators using inverted commas, placing the Sanskrit text of the *pratīka* after its translation to help the reader locate the relevant part of the *Nyāyāmṛta*.

The texts of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and its commentaries have been derived from the various printed editions available to me. While I am obviously not attempting to make a critical edition of the various works translated here, I have also collected variant readings from these editions. I present these variants simply for the sake of showing what is currently known about the transmission of these texts. Any variant readings are listed just after the text in which they occur. The readings are coordinated with the root text by the use of corresponding superscript numbers. The full bibliographical details for the editions used are given in the Bibliography.

Additionally, I provide readings from a manuscript of the *Advaitasiddhi* that was made available to me by the Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project (Acc No. 5/5599; Inventory No. 1066). The manuscript was written on paper by a single hand in Devanagari script, with occasional marginal glosses added by a second hand. The text starts from the beginning of the *Advaitasiddhi* and runs continuously until it stops abruptly on folio 52v, at the beginning of the section in which Madhusūdana responds to Vyāsātīrtha’s arguments to prove that only truly existent things can have causal efficacy (*Advaitasiddhi*, NAB, 1:569). There are no obvious clues in the manuscript that would allow us to ascribe it a definite date.

**Tab. 8.1:** Editions consulted

<b>Siglum</b>	<b>Text(s)</b>	<b>Editor</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Year</b>
ASMu	Advaitasiddhi, Siddhivyākhyā, Gauḍabrahmānandī, Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāyī	Anantakrishna Sastri	Mumbai	1917
ASMy	Advaitasiddhi, Gurucandrikā	D. Srinivasachar & G. Venkatanarasimha Sastri	Mysuru	1933
ASv	Advaitasiddhi, Bālabodhinī	Yogendranath Bagchi	Varanasi	1971
NAB	Nyāyāmṛta et. al.	Krishna Tatacharya Pandurangi	Bengaluru	1994
NAMu	Nyāyāmṛta, Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa	T. R. Krishnacharya	Mumbai	1908
NAK	Nyāyāmṛta et. al.	Anantakrishna Sastri	Kolkata	1934
NATMu	Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī	T. R Krishnacharya	Mumbai	1910
NAPB	Nyāyāmṛta, Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa	A. Haridāsa Bhatta	Bengaluru	2008